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ABSTRACT
More than a third of our states have given judges a little-known power
to dismiss prosecutions, not because of legal or factual insufficiency, but
for the sake of justice. Whether phrased as dismissals “in furtherance of
justice” or dismissals of de minimis prosecutions, these exercises of
judicial power teach two important lessons.
First, judges exercising these dismissals are rebutting the common
notion that in the face of over-criminalization and over-incarceration they
are powerless to do more than rubber-stamp prosecutorial decision
making. In individual cases, they push back against some of the most
problematic aspects of our criminal justice system: its size, harshness, and
bias.
Second, these cases converge on shared principles of justice. These
principles conjure a vision of a very different criminal justice system: one
in which an alleged criminal act is viewed not in isolation, but within a
broader context that includes the apparent motivations for it, the state’s
role in and response to it, and possible responses other than the criminal
law. There is no logical reason to confine these principles to this
procedural context, and the Article urges their broader consideration.
INTRODUCTION
There is broad agreement among experts about the urgent need to
reform our system of over-criminalization and over-incarceration.1 But
these experts have differed as to tactics: should one chip away at the most
troubling aspects of the system, or strike at the foundations of the system,2
aiming for a fundamentally different vision of criminal justice?3 The recent
presidential transition has made these questions more salient and added
1. See Letter from Undersigned ALI Members and Advisers to ALI Director, Deputy Director,
Project Reporters, Council and Members (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/ALI-Apr.-4-2016-Memorandum.pdf (regarding Preliminary Draft No. 6:
Revisions to Sexual Assault Provisions of Model Penal Code) (“[T]here is broad consensus that the
States have criminalized too much behavior and have incarcerated too many people.”).
2. See Joseph Margulies, War Crimes in a Punitive Age, VERDICT (May 2, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/05/02/war-crimes-in-a-punitive-age (stating that the real problem with
current criminal justice reform is that it “deliberately does nothing to alter the organizing philosophy
that created and sustains the carceral state,” and does not change the assumptions currently underlying
the carceral state: assumptions “about human nature, individual responsibility, and the relationship
between the individual and the state”).
3. See Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 352, 359 n.29 (2015) (“The abolitionist vision is in tension, of course, with the nearer term calls
for indictments and imprisonment of police who have killed Black folks.”); Margulies, supra note 2
(“People who hope to change things for the better cannot continue to dwell unproductively on particular
problems with the criminal justice system, though there are many. Instead, we have to articulate a
different philosophy of criminal justice.”).
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new ones. Can and will the judiciary provide a robust check on executive
moves to expand the criminal justice system?4 And as federal decision
makers pursue an aggressive interpretation of “law and order,”5 will the
states be the site of criminal justice reform, or at least resistance?6
This Article analyzes an important set of tools available to criminal
court judges in more than a third of our states. The case law applying these
tools offers examples of judges providing a check on the executive, and, in
doing so, simultaneously chipping away at some of the worst excesses of
our system and striving toward a vision of a different system. This Article
urges that this site of reform and these modes of reform be unearthed and
remembered as a new era begins.
Nineteen states have given trial courts the power to dismiss
prosecutions for the sake of justice.7 Whether granting a power to dismiss
“in furtherance of justice” or a power to dismiss de minimis prosecutions,
these statutes allow judges to determine that while a case is permitted in
criminal court, it should not be pursued.8
These statutes have received surprisingly little attention,9 even while
some of the problems that they can do something about are bemoaned and
said to be intractable. Only a handful of scholarly articles have focused on
these statutes,10 and judicial opinions often remark upon the failure of
defense attorneys to invoke them.11 This neglect on the part of scholars and
advocates should be remedied for two reasons.
4.
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2016, 3:55
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/803567993036754944 (“Nobody should be allowed to
burn the American flag—if they do, there must be consequences—perhaps loss of citizenship or year in
jail!”).
5. See, e.g., Memorandum from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to Federal Prosecutors (May 10,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download (“[I]t is a core principle that
prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.”).
6. See Yamiche Alcindor, Minorities Worry What a ‘Law and Order’ Donald Trump Presidency
Will Mean, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/us/politics/minoritiesworry-what-a-law-and-order-donald-trump-presidency-will-mean.html; German Lopez, The Case for
Optimism on Criminal Justice Reform—Even Under President Trump, VOX (Nov. 10, 2016, 3:00 PM),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/10/13580644/president-trump-criminal-justice-2016.
7. See infra notes 21, 31 and accompanying text.
8. While this Article uses “statutes” for ease of discussion, five states (Alaska, Arizona, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington) include their in furtherance dismissal power solely in court rules that do not
require legislative approval. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43(c); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 16.6(b); UTAH R. CRIM.
P. 25(a); VT. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)(2); WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3(b).
9. See, e.g., M. Beth Henzel, Defense Categories and the (Category-Defying) De Minimis
Defense, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 545, 545 (2016) (“De minimis defenses are an understudied aspect of
law, appearing in legal practice more often than in legal theory but rarely garnering any type of
extensive analysis in either.”); see also Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime,
and the “De Minimis” Defense, 1997 BYU. L. REV. 51, 51 (“Surprisingly, one of the most innovative,
interesting, and complex provisions of the Model Penal Code, section 2.12, has attracted little attention,
certainly much less than it deserves.”).
10. See infra note 52.
11. See infra note 173.
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First, these statutes, and the dismissals that they permit, achieve
important ends in individual cases. They offer a way to tackle some of the
most prominent flaws within the criminal law: its size, its harshness, and its
disparate enforcement.12 In doing so, they challenge the notion that judges
can do little more than rubber-stamp prosecutorial discretion.13 This tool is
certainly not a panacea: for example, courts have invoked the separation of
powers as a constraint on the circumstances in which dismissals can be
granted;14 in addition, the success of dismissal motions is dependent on
individual judicial preferences, and thus potentially dependent on explicit
and implicit bias.15 Yet, these dismissals offer an escape valve, for some
defendants, from the myriad destructive consequences of prosecution and
conviction.16
Second, these dismissals are important because of the vision that they
offer when read as a body of cases. Interpreting multiple statutory
provisions, and in multiple states, judges ordering dismissals repeatedly
converge on the same principles of justice.17 If one weaves together these
threads, what emerges is something that is urgently needed18: a vision of a
different criminal justice system. Rather than a decontextualized focus on
alleged wrongdoing, this vision involves a more circumspect approach in
which one considers various aspects of context: the extent of governmental
involvement in the alleged lawbreaking, the availability of responses other
than the criminal law, the costs of criminal prosecution and conviction, and
the apparent motives behind the defendant’s alleged acts.19 In invoking
these principles, judges show us that even in the bleak circumstances of
criminal court, vision is possible, and they bolster those scholars who have
12. See Jonathan Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist
Assumptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 999, 1000 (2013).
13. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1243–44 (2011)
(“[P]rosecutorial discretion is largely unreviewable and unchecked . . . .”); id. at 1268 n.96 (mentioning
as potential checks on prosecutorial charging decisions only “grand jury indictment, judicial probable
cause determinations, and jury and judicial reasonable doubt findings at trial”).
14. See infra notes 195–97. For the endurance of these statutes despite potential separation of
powers concerns, see, for example, State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Vt. 1995) (“[D]espite the
number of jurisdictions with similar longstanding laws, the State has not cited, and we have not found,
any case striking down such a law as an unconstitutional violation of the separation-of-powers
doctrine.”); id. (citing People v. Kirby, 460 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1983) for the proposition that a trial court’s
“inherent authority to terminate prosecution to assure integrity of its judgment is traceable to
separation-of-powers principle”).
15. See infra notes 251–67 (implicit bias); infra note 249 (explicit bias).
16. See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, NATIONAL INVENTORY
OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION (NICCC) [hereinafter “NICCC”],
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (providing state-by-state list of collateral
consequences, including 1,831 in California alone).
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See Margulies, supra note 2 (urging “the need to develop a unified, transformative vision of
criminal justice”).
19. See infra Part IV.A.
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urged these kinds of approaches but have been unable to point to much
real-world support.20
Paradoxically, it may be that some of the constraints that limit what can
be achieved in individual cases have helped to enable this vision. For it
may be that restrictions on this remedy reassure judges that they are
operating in a relatively low-stakes context, and thus, that they can make
broad declarations without much risk. It may also be that the empathy that
is so vulnerable to bias is part of what moves judges to make broad
statements about what justice requires. Yet, this Article urges that if these
principles resonate in this procedural context, there is no logical reason
why they should not be considered in other areas of the criminal justice
system, including those where some of the constraints operating in this
context do not apply.
Part I will introduce this group of statutes. Part II will describe a first
set of reasons why they deserve more attention, giving examples of their
use in individual cases to tackle some of the most pressing concerns about
the criminal justice system. Part III will note constraints that limit this
remedy, in ways that limit defendant protections throughout the criminal
justice system, such as judicial narrowing of the remedy, and the human
variability of the decision maker. Part IV will describe the second set of
contributions that this body of law offers: the principles of justice on which
judges rely in ordering dismissals, and the composite vision that these
principles create. There is no logical reason to confine these principles to
this specific procedural context, and their broader consideration may help
stop the struggle for defendant protections from becoming an entirely
reactive one.
I. THE STATUTES
This Part will describe first the group of statutes permitting in
furtherance of justice dismissals and then the group of statutes permitting
de minimis dismissals, before explaining the commonalities between the
two. It will end by describing the variety of approaches taken by
jurisdictions that reject this type of statute.
A. Dismissals in Furtherance of Justice
Fifteen states and Puerto Rico have enacted statutes that give the courts
power to dismiss a prosecution in furtherance of justice.21 New York is

20. See infra note 299. I am grateful to Justin Murray for the reminder that scholars are far from
the only visionaries in this area, and that many non-scholarly visionaries have indeed achieved realworld results.
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unique in having two statutes—one allowing dismissals of misdemeanors,22
and one allowing dismissals of felonies23—and in including in each a
detailed list of grounds for dismissal. In New York, a prosecution may be
dismissed in furtherance of justice when:
such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the
existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance
clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution
of
the
defendant upon such [indictment] or count would constitute or
result in injustice. In determining whether such compelling factor,
consideration, or circumstance exists, the court must, to the extent
applicable, examine and consider, individually and collectively, the
following:
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible
at trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement
personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the
defendant;
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a
sentence authorized for the offense;
(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the
community;
(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the
public in the criminal justice system;
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the
complainant or victim with respect to the motion;
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of
conviction would serve no useful purpose.24
New York is important not only because of its unique statutory provisions,
but also because it was the first state to enact legislation giving this kind of

21. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.21 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401(1) (West 2015);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney
2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 815 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2003); ALASKA R. CRIM. P.
43(c); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 16.6(b); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54–56
(2009); IDAHO CODE § 19-3504 (2017); IDAHO CRIM. R. 48(a)(2); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.33(1); OHIO R.
CRIM. P. 48(b); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25(a); VT. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)(2); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 8.3; see also P.R.
R. CRIM. P. 247(b).
22. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney 2007).
23. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 2007).
24. Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney 2007).

2 ROBERTS 327-380 (DO NOT DELETE)

334

11/14/2017 8:30 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 69:2:327

power to judges.25 Since the common law, prosecutors had possessed the
ability to dismiss cases through their nolle prosequi power.26 While this
was originally a power vested solely in prosecutors,27 in 1828 New York
took a first step toward limiting prosecutorial power in this regard, by
making the power one that was subject to court approval.28 New York went
further in 1881, passing dual provisions on the issue: the first removed the
nolle prosequi power from the prosecutor, and the second put it “where it
should alone rest, in the hands of the court.”29 The legislature thus
corrected a situation that it had found nonsensical: one in which the
prosecutor had more power than the judge, who was “unable, no matter
how unjust may be the continuance of the indictment against the defendant,
to relieve him from that injustice, until the district attorney chooses to
consent that it do so.”30
B. De Minimis Dismissals
In 1962, the drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) created the first
de minimis statute: MPC Rule 2.12. Subsequently, four states (Hawaii,
Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) and Guam enacted statutes based on
MPC 2.12.31 This kind of statute is therefore more recent than the first in
furtherance statutes, but again has ancient roots.32 It rests on the common

25. See John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York’s “Interests of Justice” Dismissal
Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 178 (1994).
26. “Nolle prosequi is a formal entry on the record by the prosecuting officer by which he
declares that he will not prosecute the case further, either as to some of the counts of the indictment, or
as to part of a divisible count, or as to some of the persons accused, or altogether.” Nolle Prosequi,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). “[T]he writ of nolle prosequi did not extend plenary power
to prosecutors to dismiss in furtherance of justice, as the New York statute permits. Rather, the
‘Attorney-General’s power was used for two quite different purposes: to dispose of technically
imperfect proceedings instituted by the Crown; and to put a stop to oppressive, but technically
impeccable, proceedings instituted by private prosecutors.’” Wirenius, supra note 25, at 178 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
27. Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the Existing
Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 846 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v.
Kindness, 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977)).
28. Wirenius, supra note 25, at 178.
29. COMM’RS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, REPORT ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF
STATE
OF
NEW
YORK
343
(1850),
THE
https://ia800202.us.archive.org/13/items/codecriminalpro00pleagoog/codecriminalpro00pleagoog.pdf.
30. Id.
31. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 (2006); N.J.
STAT ANN. § 2C: 2-11 (2011); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 312 (2015); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. 7.67
(1980). Importantly, Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey departed from the MPC’s “shall dismiss” in favor
of “may dismiss.” See HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (“court may dismiss”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 12 (“court may dismiss”); N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C: 2-11 (“judge may dismiss”).
32. See HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 258 (1966) (“The maxim had its
original application in Roman law . . . .”).

2 ROBERTS 327-380 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/14/2017 8:30 PM

Dismissals as Justice

335

law principle de minimis non curat lex (“The law does not concern itself
with trifles.”).33
The MPC provision contains three separate grounds for dismissal (the
second of which is divided into two alternative bases). Its text is as follows:
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the
nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the
nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant’s
conduct:
(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither
expressly negatived by the person whose interest was
infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law
defining the offense; or
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only
to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of
conviction; or
(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably
be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the
offense.34
The drafters of the MPC have provided some insight into the thinking
behind Rule 2.12. When the draft was introduced, Reporter Herbert
Wechsler noted that judges have a “kind of unarticulated authority to
mitigate the general provisions of the criminal law to prevent absurd
applications” and expressed a desire to bring it to the surface.35 A
subsequent MPC Comment elaborated,36 stating that “Section 2.12
authorizes courts to exercise a power inherent in other agencies of criminal
justice to ignore merely technical violations of law.”37 The drafters viewed
a judicial “[a]meliorative power” as essential, since “if every law were
rigorously enforced as ‘precisely and narrowly laid down,’ the criminal law
would be ‘ordered but intolerable.’”38 They were careful to state that they
did not reject the notion that prosecutors have a “parallel power” to
dismiss, but that they did reject the notion that it was only the prosecutor
who could exercise such a power, “as though he somehow had a patent
upon wise decision in such matters.”39 Once a criminal case has begun, “it
33. De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
35. Discussion of the Model Penal Code, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 61, 105 (1962).
36. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 explanatory note (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
37. Id.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.12 cmt. 2, at 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1985)
(quoting Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 153 (1953)).
39. Id. at 402 n.9.
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is very much the court’s business to see that a just disposition, which in
appropriate cases may include a dismissal of the prosecution, is reached.”40
C. Commonalities
No state has both a de minimis and an in furtherance of justice statute:
rather, these are alternative ways of serving a similar function. At their
core, these statutes are not about the legal or factual merits of a
prosecution,41 or about guilt or innocence,42 but are about a determination
that while the case is permitted in criminal court, it should not be pursued.43
Put differently, “[b]oth mechanisms are designed to act as safety valves
with which to evade strict application of the law when factors not normally
considered in the criminal judicial process appear relevant in individual
situations.”44 One sees the interplay between the two sets of statutes in the
fact that the MPC’s commentary refers to the “in furtherance of justice”
statutes,45 while the factors contained within the most detailed in
furtherance statute—that of New York—“resembl[e] the judicial
interpretation of the de minimis statute in other states.”46 While one might
assume from their name that de minimis dismissals are limited to “minor”
alleged offenses, none of the de minimis statutes exclude any particular
type of charge from their coverage.47
A second shared feature is that these statutes generally require that the
reasons for dismissal be put on the record.48 This requirement, which was

40. Id.
41. See State v. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d 284, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (stating that in
determining whether to dismiss, “it must be assumed that the conduct charged actually occurred”);
Joseph W. Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1982).
42. See People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1980).
43. See People v. Curtis, 784 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Table) (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003).
44. Wanderer & Connors, supra note 27, at 845.
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.12 cmt. 3, at 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1985)
(citing in furtherance statutes to support the notion that various states have left “[a]melioration of the
letter of the law” to “existing statutes and practices”).
46. Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal Negotiations, 20
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 86 (2015).
47. See Zarrilli, 523 A.2d at 287 (“The de minimis statute applies to all prohibited conduct.”);
Martin H. Belsky, Joseph Dougherty & Steven H. Goldblatt, Three Prosecutors Look at the New
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 793, 807 (1974) (noting that “[de minimis] Section 312
gives the judiciary power to dismiss any prosecution at any stage or for any crime.”); see also State v.
Fitzpatrick, 772 A.2d 1093, 1096 (Vt. 2001) (suggesting that “serious” charges do not preclude an in
furtherance dismissal).
48. See Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629, 656
(2015) (“All the noted [in furtherance] states, except Vermont, require the court to state its reasons on
the record for dismissal. In Vermont, the court must only do so if the prosecution objects to the
dismissal.”); Oliver & Batra, supra note 46, at 83 (“Unlike prosecutors, . . . judges dismissing cases
under de minimis statutes must provide reasons for their actions and their decisions are often made
public.”).
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imposed as a check on arbitrariness,49 has led to a large body of case law,
in which an array of justifications for dismissal is recorded.50
In addition to commonalities in function and procedure, these two sets
of statutes have something else in common: neglect by both scholars and
advocates.51 While each of the two groups has received some scholarly
attention, it is slight, and only a handful of pieces have discussed the two
groups of statutes together.52
D. What Other Jurisdictions Do
Two-thirds of our states lack these statutes, and the federal system has
also rejected them. The Federal Rules Committee proposed adding an in
furtherance of justice provision to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure53—one that would have been available, for example, in de
minimis prosecutions54—but it was rejected,55 and federal courts attempting
to invoke such a concept have been reversed.56
Where no statute exists, two possibilities remain for judges who feel
moved by concerns similar to those embodied within the statutes. First, the
case law in several states mentions an inherent judicial power to dismiss

49. See, e.g., People v. Belge, 359 N.E.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. 1976).
50. See People v. Superior Court, 917 P.2d 628, 647–48 (Cal. 1996).
51. See, e.g., Melissa Beth Valentine, Defense Categories and the (Category-Defying) De
Minimis Defense, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 545, 545 (2016) (“De minimis defenses are an understudied
aspect of law, appearing in legal practice more often than in legal theory but rarely garnering any type
of extensive analysis in either.”).
52. See Beety, supra note 48; Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1317 (2006); Oliver & Batra, supra note 46; Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion
in the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (1988); Wanderer & Connors,
supra note 27.
53. 48 F.R.D. 553, 640 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure 1970). The provision would have been Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b)(2), and its
addition would have meant a subsection (b) phrased as follows (the italics indicate new language):
(b) . . . the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint:
(1) if there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing any
information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if
there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial.
(2) if, for any other reason, it concludes that such dismissal will serve the ends of
justice and the effective administration of the court’s business.
Id.
54. Id.
55. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
RULES OF PROCEDURE, 52 F.R.D. 87 (1971).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Lamb,
294 F. Supp. 419, 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (“[The de minimis] doctrine applies to questions of minimal
damage and transactions between one person and another, not to transactions between a person and the
sovereign.”).
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prosecutions in certain circumstances.57 This is a circumscribed power,58
however, and one that most states reject.59 Second, judges may act sub
rosa, perhaps masking their reasons behind findings of fact.60 It was a
desire to bring this sort of dismissal out into the open that motivated the
drafters of the MPC and jurisdictions that followed them.61
Not all those whose jurisdictions lack such statutes are happy about
that fact. At least one federal judge has expressed a desire that the federal
judiciary be given the power to dismiss in furtherance of justice.62 And in a
recent District of Columbia case, one concurring judge wished that the
court were able to dismiss on grounds that the prosecution was de
minimis.63 Give us what Hawaii and New Jersey have, he urged the
legislature, as he was forced to go along with the affirmation of a
conviction for snatching at a cell phone at the end of a long hot day at the
Department of Motor Vehicles.64 “De minimis non curat lex” read the
heading of his opinion,65 but his call to reclaim this principle went
unheeded.
II. THE POWER OF INDIVIDUAL CASES
The first reason why these statutes deserve more attention is that the
cases interpreting them offer ways, in individual instances, of pushing back
against some of the aspects of our criminal justice system that provoke the
strongest critiques: its size, its harshness, and its bias. In doing so, they

57. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 54 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); People v.
Lenz, 703 N.E.2d 971, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); State v. Boehmer, 203 P.3d 1274 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009);
State v. Odom, 993 So.2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v. Thurston, 642 N.E.2d 1024
(Mass. 1994); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tenn. 1978).
58. See State v. Shelton, 802 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), vacated, 830 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992).
59. See People v. Stewart, 217 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974). In most states that lack
this kind of statute, the general approach is to reject the concept of an inherent authority to dismiss. See,
e.g., id.
60. See Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality—Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L.
REV. 177, 230 (1981) (“In jury trials, [judges] can direct jurors to acquit when evidence clearly supports
a finding of guilt; when trial is before the bench, they can acquit though persuaded of legal guilt.”).
61. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 cmt. (West 2011); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 7.67 cmt. (2017).
62. See Frederic Block, Reflections on Guns and Jury Nullification—and Judicial Nullification,
CHAMPION, July 2009, at 17 (“[S]hould not federal law recognize, as New York State does, that in a
worthy exceptional case, ‘the letter of the law gracefully and charitably [should] succumb to the spirit
of justice’?”) (second alteration in original) (quoting People v. Rickert, 58 N.Y.2d 122, 126 (N.Y.
1983).
63. Watson v. United States, 979 A.2d 1254, 1268 (D.C. 2009).
64. See id. (“[I]n my view, the adoption of the relevant provisions of the MPC (or of the Hawaii
and New Jersey variations of the MPC) would promote justice by protecting citizens from significant
burdens attendant upon a criminal conviction when they have committed, at most, trifling and
essentially harmless violations of the law.”).
65. Id. at 1258.
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unsettle the notion that judges are unable or unwilling to do more in
relation to these kinds of problems, and in relation to prosecutorial
predominance, than apply a rubber-stamp. This Part will offer examples of
the exercise of this power under each of these three (necessarily
overlapping) headings, before pulling together the ways in which these
examples challenge conventional wisdom about state court power.
A. Size
In individual cases, judges who dismiss are tackling some of the ways
in which the criminal justice system can be said to be too big. As this Part
will explain, they are separating the concepts of justice and prosecution,
they are responding to over-expenditure of resources, and they are offering
an “escape valve” from our criminal justice machinery when so many
others are blocked.
First, these cases (and the statutes) are teasing apart the concepts of
prosecution and justice, often fused in the public’s mind.66 When justice
comes to seem synonymous with prosecution, there is little hope of
reducing the amount of prosecution. These cases chip away in individual
instances at the notion of synonymy. They remind the prosecution and the
public that we have in many instances lost track of the common law notion
that “de minimis non curat lex.”67 The criminal law does currently concern
itself with trifles,68 and judicial action may be necessary in response. Thus,
a New Jersey court dismissed a prosecution for alleged theft of three pieces
of bubble gum, pointing out that “[i]n the milieu of bubble gum pilferage
the only cases more trivial are those involving two pieces or one.”69
Another dismissed the theft prosecution of a man who, after commencing
lunch at the unlimited Cornucopia Buffet at the Garden State’s Golden
Nugget casino, had allegedly taken five pieces of fruit back to his room to
eat.70 Beyond the realm of “trifles,” these cases endorse a notion that a true
justice system is a system that holds back from prosecution in some of the
66.
See Joseph Margulies, Finding Justice in Baltimore, VERDICT, (June 27, 2016)
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/06/27/finding-justice-baltimore (“In the carceral state, we have
developed such a crabbed view of justice that we imagine it as nothing more than a criminal
conviction. . . . I hope we want accountability for what happened, and change to ensure it never happens
again. Why should we think a criminal prosecution is the only—or even the best—way to achieve these
goals?”).
67. See Oliver & Batra, supra note 46, at 85 (suggesting that the de minimis provision was
designed to “provide a public forum to publicly discuss the appropriate exercise of discretion by
prosecutors when they consider declining a particular case”).
68. See, e.g., Alex Koma, Milk Theft Charges on Hold—For Now, INSIDENOVA (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://www.insidenova.com/headlines/charges-dropped-in-milk-theft-case/article_c3481d0c-bc26-11e6b096-3fe9f68f7349.html (describing charges against a teenager alleged to have stolen a carton of milk).
69. State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
70. State v. Nevens, 485 A.2d 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
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circumstances in which it could be carried out, and indeed that a strong
society is one in which restraint is shown.71 Thus, for example, courts have
used their dismissal powers where they found that prosecution was targeted
at mental illness,72 drug addiction,73 or poverty,74 rather than wrongdoing.
Second, in these cases, courts are doing something to address the
resources that they see being devoted to an overly large system of criminal
prosecution. They point to over-crowded dockets,75 and try to identify and
remediate some of the harms that result: harms to the possibility of
individualized justice,76 to the prosecution of other cases (potential or
actual),77 to the speedy trial rights of defendants,78 and to civil justice.79
This concern about resources includes an explicit focus on money.
Courts allude to the money being spent on prosecution, and the ways in
which it could be better used, whether on other prosecutions, other
71. See People v. Gragert, 765 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003) (“[C]ertainly our
society is strong enough to recognize the mitigating circumstances present here and forego the
prosecution of this young woman.”).
72. People v. Coleman, 466 N.Y.S.2d 620, 623 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1983) (dismissing charge relating
to alleged receipt of Valium prescription from two doctors simultaneously, and noting that “[t]he
defendant was a psychotic at the moment the alleged crime was perpetrated”).
73. See People v. A.T., 589 N.Y.S.2d 980, 983 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) (dismissing charge of
possession of a hypodermic needle against “a defendant who is his own victim of a life of drug
addiction, which has left him permanently disabled and chronically ill”).
74. See People v. Cunningham, 431 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980).
75. State v. Kinchen, 707 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Conn. 1998).
76. See People v. Jones, 484 N.Y.S.2d 415, 423 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984) (dismissing where “the
People are persisting in the prosecution of these cases solely for the vindication of principle as opposed
to each case’s individual merits”); People v. Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d 936, 949 n.18 (Syr. City Ct. 1981)
(dismissing where the prosecution’s “blanket policy of insisting on full payment of Family Court
arrears, in addition to a plea of guilty to the charge, fails to recognize that every case must be dealt with
on an individual basis”), rev’d, 459 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1981).
77. See Kinchen, 707 A.2d at 1258 (quoting judge as saying that “[y]ou know, we have a lot of
serious cases on the jury [list]. We have a burglary [case] right behind this. We have six cases [for
which] subpoenas are out behind this case, and in twenty-six years I have never tried a trespassing case
to the jury. . . . Now we have a situation here where clerks are being let go, we have backlogs, and quite
frankly, I would be embarrassed to put this [case] before a jury who has taken their time off from
work.”); State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (dismissing indictment
alleging theft of three pieces of bubble gum, and stating that “[d]eterrence . . . cannot itself justify
making a sacrificial lamb of the most minor of offenders. This is especially so when there are others
available for prosecution whose offenses are not trivial”); People v. Arroyo, 815 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2006) (“The police should concentrate their noble efforts on behalf of the city on
countering real crimes committed every day. They do not need to manipulate a situation where
temptation may overcome even people who would normally never think of committing a crime.”);
People. v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979) (“At a time of public outcry about the
inability of our system of justice to deal effectively with violent crime, we are still wasting valuable
court time and taxpayer funds on a victimless crime [prostitution], the existence of which as a fact of
human nature was recognized without particular disapproval as far back as Genesis 38:15.”).
78. See State v. Fitzpatrick, 772 A.2d 1093, 1099 (Vt. 2001) (docket congestion “may affect the
ability of the trial court to provide a speedy trial to the defendant before it and to other defendants”).
79. See State v. Sulgrove, 578 P.2d 74, 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (judge dismissed, noting that
prosecutor’s “unpreparedness” had an adverse effect on civil matters in a court whose docket was
“congested by criminal cases”).
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governmental functions, or however the taxpayer would like to use it.80
Something has gone wrong, for example, when thousands of dollars are
spent prosecuting a 20-year-old for an alleged sip of beer.81 Where a
woman was tried for prostitution after being arrested by an undercover
agent who had feigned an interest in sex, a Minnesotan judge—of the view
that “[n]othing happened here except a little pathetic slice of life from the
streets of Minneapolis”—noted the costs of a trial, and of an appeal
litigated by two tax-funded attorneys.82 He then fantasized about how the
money might otherwise have been used: “If this case never happened and
half the money spent went back to the taxpayers, they would be happy. If
the other half of the money went to appellant for as many months at a
technical school or a local college that the money would cover, she would
be better off.”83
Third, these courts are providing an escape valve, or safety valve,84 in
what can appear to be a pipeline straight from arrest to conviction85: a way
to “open the door of the courtroom,”86 and try to “save the single individual
before [the court]” from pre-adjudication and post-conviction harm.87 In
doing so, they are acting in accord with a common theme in discussions of
the architecture of the American criminal justice system: that there should
be means of escape for reasons other than legal or factual insufficiency.88
They are doing so at a time when this particular means of escape may be
particularly urgent, because of the mass funneling of cases into the criminal
80. People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 340 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1980) (dismissing charge relating
to alleged consensual sex act in public bathroom, where conviction “would appear to involve an
unwarranted expenditure of the public’s time, effort and resources and a judgment of conviction would
serve no useful purpose”); Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 948 n.15 (dismissing charges of failure to pay child
support where “as a result of these prosecutions, the taxpayers are bearing the additional costs of
representing at least three defendants and extensively utilizing the court process”).
81. In re Shorto, 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 222, 227 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1980) (“A sip (or sips) of beer by a
person 77 days short of his or her 21st birthday is NOT such socially prohibited conduct that thousands
of taxpayers’ dollars are to be used to prosecute the sippee [sic] and the licensee upon whose premises
the sipping took place.”).
82. State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007).
83. Id.
84. See State v. Goodwin, 129 A.3d 316, 323 (N.J. 2016) (“The de minimis provision acts as a
safety valve, permitting dismissal of a charge that is too trivial to warrant prosecution.”); Wanderer &
Connors, supra note 27, at 844 (“[S]tatutes and rules similar to the de minimis statute [i.e., in
furtherance statutes] . . . also create a safety valve to offload otherwise criminal conduct from
prosecution when the individual circumstances warrant.”).
85. For fact that arrests and guilty pleas share the same factual requirement—probable cause—
see David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 42–44
(1984).
86. People v. Shanis, 374 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
87. People v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342, 346 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979).
88. See Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1285 (2016) (“The American
criminal justice system is designed with safety valves in mind . . . .”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 cmt.
1, at 400 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“The power that this section confers upon the courts is commonly
exercised by other agencies in the criminal justice system . . . .”).
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justice system,89 because the consequences are so numerous and
profound,90 and because so many of the escape valves envisioned by
criminal justice system theorists are blocked.91 Police are supposed to act as
an escape valve, with discretion to refrain from an arrest; yet, incentives to
arrest frequently make that a nugatory power.92 Prosecutors can decline to
charge, and can move to dismiss after charges have been filed,93 but
incentives and adversarial culture frequently block this power also.94 Grand
jurors have the power to vote against an indictment even if they believe
probable cause to have been established,95 but they endorse prosecutorial
requests in the vast majority of cases.96 Jurors have the ability to vote not
guilty even if they believe guilt to have been proven beyond a reasonable

89. See, e.g., People v. LaFont, 978 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2014) (dismissal of case
against woman alleged to have intervened when police tried to handcuff her husband (who had just had
heart surgery) after she called 911 to request an ambulance for him); Matthew Epperson, Where Police
TIMES
(Jan.
13,
2016),
Violence
Encounters
Mental
Illness,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/opinion/where-police-violence-encounters-mentalillness.html?_r=0.
90. See NICCC, supra note 16.
91. See Kent Greenawalt, The Cultural Defense: Reflections in Light of the Model Penal Code
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299, 306–07 (2008).
92. See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 293 (2014) (“The pressure on
police to exercise discretion to make arrests for minor offenses, such as enjoying a beer on one’s own
stoop on a summer evening, has significantly increased the number of individuals in the lower criminal
courts that the public might deem to be normatively innocent.”); id. at 318 n.181 (discussing pressures
on police to meet quotas).
93. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 128 (2004) (“Police have wide latitude in deciding whether to
arrest an individual and file charges. Likewise, prosecutors can choose whether to accept police
officers’ recommendations and pursue those charges. Particularly for lower-level crimes, police may
not arrest and prosecutors may decline to charge or may divert cases for alternative resolution after
charging.”).
94. See Howell, supra note 92, at 301 (“For the most part, assistant district attorneys prosecute
minor victimless crimes, not because they want to, but because they are assigned to do so early in their
careers and feel that they must do so to advance their careers.”); id. at 312–13 (“[T]he one decision that
prosecutors are typically required to document is the decision to dismiss. It is far easier to bring charges
in all cases than to engage in individualized assessment or risk alienating police.”); Wirenius, supra
note 25, at 176 n.6 (calling this an “illusory” shield because of prosecutorial “siege mentality,” and
stating that “[t]he adversary system leads inexorably to prosecutors who identify justice as a ‘win’ for
their side”); Jessica Lussenhop, Could ‘Actual Innocence’ Save the Broken US Justice System?, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35971935 (“[B]ecause of some of
the professional incentives to get convictions and maintain convictions, and political incentives to be
tough on crime, the justice role takes a back seat to the advocacy role.”).
95. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 703, 705 (2008).
96. See Andrew D. Leipold, Prosecutorial Charging Practices and Grand Jury Screening, in
GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY (Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (“[I]t
is hard to find support . . . for a claim that grand juries currently serve as a meaningful check on
prosecutorial charging decisions”); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for
Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 50 n.220 (2002) (estimating that only
eight percent of felony cases presented to New York grand juries result in dismissals or reductions).
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doubt—to nullify, in other words97—but almost without exception
governmental authorities refrain from telling them about this power98 and
take active steps to prevent them from learning of it through other means.99
In any event, the percentage of cases in which a jury makes the final
decision is a small one.100 Even within that small percentage of cases, the
frequent silencing of criminal defendants at trial may leave jurors with little
motivation to offer an escape.101
A variety of potential “safety valves” exist after conviction—the
judge’s ability to demonstrate “leniency” at sentencing, an appellate court’s
ability to reduce a sentence,102 the ability of the parole board to permit
release, pardons, and other acts of “clemency.” All such safety valves are
unable to address the harms that accumulated until the moment of relief,
many are infrequently awarded,103 and in the case of sentencing, even the
most “lenient” judge may be constrained by mandatory sentencing

97. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
98. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 598 (2017) (“[A]lthough
jurors have the legal ability to nullify, courtroom actors cannot inform them of this ability.”).
99. See, e.g., Noelle Phillips, Denver Activists File Federal Lawsuit Over Jury Nullification
Arrests, DENVER POST (Aug. 17, 2015, 7:42 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/08/17/denveractivists-file-federal-lawsuit-over-jury-nullification-arrests/. Note that the factors that appear to
persuade jurors to nullify are similar to those highlighted in this article as important to judges ordering
dismissals. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 301–02 (1996)
(“[J]uries sometimes acquit against the evidence when the harm caused by the defendant is de minimis,
when the victim’s conduct contributed to the harm, when jurors believe the defendant already has
suffered enough, and when the government appears to have acted improperly.”).
100. See Howell, supra note 92, at 319 (stating that in New York City, there is one trial for every
570 non-felony cases, and one jury trial for every 1800 non-felony arrests); Roth, supra note 88, at
1287 (noting that “the shift toward streamlining through low-level proxy offenses that do not trigger the
right to a jury trial has rendered less frequent the exercise of equitable and merciful discretion by fact
finders”).
101. See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior
Conviction Impeachment and the Fight against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 858
(2016) (describing one cause of such silencing: prior conviction impeachment); Brief of Appellee at 46,
United States v. Taylor, 196 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999) No. 98-4141, 1999 WL 33643277, at *46
(arguing that the defendant’s testimony was important to his nullification defense, and thus that prior
conviction impeachment was appropriately permitted); see also Roth, supra note 88, at 1287 (“[T]he
shift [away from nullification in cases involving authoritative proof] is worth noting so that we do not
close other safety valves assuming that nullification will safeguard equity and mercy in an era of
increasingly authoritative proof.”).
102. See Wirenius, supra note 25, at 214.
103. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1333 (2008) (grants of clemency rare); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight
of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010); Scope of Appellate Review of
Sentences in Capital Cases, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 434, 435–36 (1960) (appellate sentence reductions rare);
cf. Michael Tonry, From Policing to Parole, in 46 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
(Michael Tonry ed., 2017) (“In the 1980s and 1990s, [parole] boards became overly cautious and risk
averse, and they became a major contributor to the rapid increase in the number of prisoners.”).
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regimes104 and is generally unable to avert a huge array of crippling postconviction consequences.105
B. Harshness
In individual cases, judges who dismiss are often pushing back at some
of the aspects of the criminal justice system that contribute to its
harshness106: over-charging,107 excessive sentences,108 pre-adjudication
hardships,109 and collateral consequences.110

104. See People v. Vecchio, 526 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1987) (“Traditionally, under
our system of justice, a sentencing court, following any guilty plea or conviction, has a substantial
degree of latitude in determining the severity or leniency of a sentence. This discretionary latitude,
however, under mandatory sentencing scheme, limited or gravely restricted by legislation which
imposes non-flexible minimums, as to a particular offense, does not enable a sentencing court to find
‘mitigating circumstances’ based upon the characteristics of the crime and/or the criminal.”).
105. See Judge Gleeson’s efforts to buck this trend through his grant of a federal certificate of
rehabilitation in Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), and his order
(subsequently reversed) that a conviction be expunged. Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448
(E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996), in which an Afghani refugee was
convicted of gross sexual assault for kissing his baby son’s penis, a conviction subsequently overturned
as being the product of a de minimis prosecution. At sentencing, “[a]lthough the court responded to this
call for leniency by imposing an entirely suspended sentence, the two convictions expose[d] Kargar to
severe consequences independent of any period of incarceration, including his required registration as a
sex offender . . . and the possibility of deportation . . . .” Id. at 85; see also Sajid A. Khan, Op-Ed: In
Defense of Brock Turner’s ‘Lenient’ Sentence, SAN JOSE INSIDE (June 24, 2016)
http://www.sanjoseinside.com/2016/06/24/op-ed-in-defense-of-brock-turners-lenient-sentence/
(describing what Brock Turner faced even with a sentence widely described as “lenient”).
106. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment
to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 113 (2007) (“American punishment has
become degrading, indecent, and undeservedly harsher despite a Constitution designed to protect people
from infliction of excessive punishment.”).
107. See State v. Pacquing, 297 P.3d 188, 194 (Haw. 2013) (quoting trial court dismissing felony
charge involving alleged presentation of false identification to a police officer, and voicing concern
“that [Pacquing] has been over-charged and his misdemeanor conduct was pigeon-holed into a felony
statute. . . . [Pacquing’s] conduct was meant to be prohibited by [misdemeanor offense] Unsworn
Falsification to Authorities” (citation omitted) (first and second alterations in original)).
108. See State v. Viernes, 988 P.2d 195, 197 (Haw. 1999) (upholding dismissal that had been
based on a finding “that a conviction for possession of this amount of methamphetamine [less than one
hundredth of a gram], which would mandate a felony conviction and a mandatory five-year term of
incarceration with a mandatory thirty days incarceration before being eligible for parole, result[s] in an
unduly harsh conviction”).
109. See People v. Wingard, 306 N.E.2d 402, 404 (N.Y. 1973) (upholding misdemeanor charge
where “any further proceedings would necessitate additional expense and would force the defendants to
lose more time from work or school”).
110. State v. Ramirez, No. CRIM.A. CR-04-213, 2005 WL 3678032, at *6 (Me. Super. Ct. Nov.
9, 2005) (dismissing charge alleging that a mother kissed her baby son’s penis, in part because “even
with a suspended jail sentence, the defendant would be subject to sex offender registration and to
potential deportation”); People v. Stewart, 656 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (trial judge
based dismissal of contempt charge against defense attorney Lynne Stewart in part on “the catastrophic
collateral effect of disbarment” that the authorized sentence would have had); Commonwealth v.
Przybyla, 722 A.2d 183, 185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (trial judge stated that he was aware of the
seriousness of the problems associated with teenage sexual behavior, but that he could not “conceive
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The action in response to collateral consequences is particularly
significant, because of the common conception that collateral consequences
are a “hidden” after-effect of the formal processes of adjudication and
sentencing, disregarded even when a sentence is being meted out.111 In
these cases, at least some of the collateral consequences are not hidden—
even before the point of sentencing. They come to light, and they persuade
judges to dismiss. And in the language used by the courts, we see
understanding of the unshakeable and destructive nature of these
consequences, which can represent a “blot,”112 a taint,113 a “constant
companion for . . . life,”114 a specter,115 and a “scarlet letter.”116 The MPC
embodies this concern by referring not to whether a conviction is justified,
but to whether “the condemnation of conviction” is justified.117 Case law in
states that have adopted this provision echo the theme.118 In New Jersey,
the legislature intended to address these problems by imposing felony criminal liability, including
Megan’s Law sanctions, on one teenager who has consensual sex with another.”).
111. See JEREMY TRAVIS, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 16 (2002) (explaining that collateral consequences have been described as “invisible
punishments” because they are “imposed by operation of law rather than by decision of the sentencing
judge . . . [and] are not considered part of the practice or jurisprudence of sentencing”); Darryl K.
Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 359–60 (2004) (“Collateral
consequences of street crime punishment are a prime example of costs the criminal justice system now
ignores.”).
112. See People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 345 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1980) (“To have [the prints
of a first-time arrestee] on file forever, to be hounded in the future on job application, to be questioned
and to have a blot on one’s record forever, is something unworthy of a democratic society.”).
113. See People v. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (“The benefit of dismissal
is not difficult to describe: it consists of the value to society of a citizen who is not tainted with a
conviction of criminal or disorderly conduct and the saving of judicial resources resulting from the
avoidance of prosecution.”).
114. Watson v. United States, 979 A.2d 1254, 1263 (D.C. 2009) (“In general, a conviction of a
criminal offense will not only subject a defendant to punishment, but it will become his constant
companion for the remainder of his life. It is likely to haunt him whenever he applies for employment,
public or private. In many or most cases, it will affect the respect which he is accorded by his fellowcitizens and bring him ‘shame before his family, friends and peers.’ It will impair his pursuit of
happiness contemplated by the drafters of our Declaration of Independence.”) (quoting State v. Smith,
480 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. 1984)).
115. See id.
116. See Commonwealth v. Pryzbyla, 722 A.2d 183, 185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (trial court “could
not believe that the legislature intended to brand for life with the scarlet letter of a felony sex conviction
a teenager who engaged in consensual sex with another sexually experienced teenager under the facts of
this case”).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
118. See Zarrilli, 523 A.2d at 289 (dismissing charge based on alleged sip by a 20-year-old from
a cup of beer, stating that “the harm to society caused or threatened by William Zarrilli’s conduct was
so minimal as not to warrant the condemnation of a conviction”); Commonwealth v. Moll, 543 A.2d
1221, 1226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citing § 312 of state criminal code to dismiss criminal mischief
prosecution based on alleged cutting of hole in county-installed storm drain pipe, to avoid flood damage
to defendant’s property, on basis that this act was “too trivial to warrant condemnation of conviction”);
Commonwealth v. Kirkwood, 520 A.2d 451, 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding case alleging injuries
sustained on dance floor ripe for de minimis dismissal where “Appellant’s conduct during the 40-second
whirlwind encounter and its lack of resultant bodily harm constitutes an infraction too trivial in nature
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for example, “[t]he use of the word condemnation is significant. It means
reprobation or censure. The Legislature in recognition of the serious
consequences which may attend a conviction has granted this dismissal
option to avoid an injustice in a case of technical but trivial guilt.”119
The action in response to sentencing is also intriguing, since it raises
the question of what those judges who have decried the fact that they are
“forced” to impose sentences that they view as “unjust and
counterproductive” would do if they had the power to dismiss instead.120
Would they find it better that one (potentially) guilty person be freed than
that one unjust and counterproductive punishment be imposed?
C. Bias
Judges applying these statutes sometimes seize the opportunity to push
back against aspects of the bias that pervades our criminal justice system.121
At least one scholar has advocated the use of motions to dismiss in the
interests of justice as a way of combating racial discrimination,122 asserting
that it is urgent, through methods such as this, to combat the notion that
“our understanding of justice is so meager that it cannot include true racial
justice.”123
In several cases, one sees judges using these dismissals to push back
against prosecutorial double standards. Thus, one judge decried the
prosecution of defense attorney Lynne Stewart for criminal contempt (as
opposed to civil contempt, which would not have jeopardized her law
license), stating that “lawyers—and particularly defense lawyers
representing a particularly despised clientele—ought not to be singled out
by reason of their vocation for disparate prosecutorial treatment.”124
to warrant the condemnation of conviction. . . . Appellant should not be stigmatized with a criminal
conviction for actions which may be considered, if not customary, at least not wholly extraordinary
during a fast dance at a tavern.”).
119. See Smith, 480 A.2d at 241.
120. See People v. Vecchio, 526 N.Y.S.2d 698, 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (describing the
dismissal power as a “safeguard” against the limitation of sentencing discretion); id. (granting dismissal
to avoid mandatory minimum prison sentence); Jed Rakoff, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District
of New York, Address at 2015 Harvard Law School Conference: Mass Incarceration and the “Fourth
Principle,” in BLOOMBERG LAW BUSINESS, https://bol.bna.com/judge-rakoff-speaks-out-at-harvardconference-full-speech/ (stating that judges are “forced to impose these sentences that many of us feel
are unjust and counterproductive”).
121. See Pomorski, supra note 9, at 99 (“[MPC 2.12(2)] can serve as an important check on
overbroad discretionary powers of prosecutors, as well as police, who exercise de facto power of
decriminalization by a practice of selective enforcement or nonenforcement.”).
122. See Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2245, 2265
(2014).
123. Id. at 2271.
124. People v. Stewart, 656 N.Y.S.2d 210, 236 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (adding that “[t]he within
motion presents an opportunity for the court not only to avert a tragically unjust outcome but to reaffirm
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Another stated that restoration to the calendar of a set of cases because of
failure to pay restitution would “create a class of status offenders, i.e., the
impoverished.”125 Finally, one Brooklyn court dismissed charges against
leaders of religious centers charged with failing to provide proper exit
lighting in their buildings.126 The court noted that “New York City public
schools and other public buildings operated by the City (including this
courthouse) were not in compliance to the same degree as similar buildings
in the private sector,”127 and that “it is apparent that the Corporation
Counsel has taken it upon itself to create a double standard in the
enforcement of the Building Code and, indeed, other municipal safety
codes.”128
The courts’ attempts to push back against inequality extend beyond
purely prosecutorial behavior. In one case, a Minneapolis judge railed
against the double standard in prostitution enforcement.129 In the case
before the court, a male officer had posed as a civilian, and arrested the
defendant after she acceded to a request to strip naked in his car.130 The
judge commented that “[f]rom time to time, there is a politically-correct
uproar urging that ‘the johns,’ meaning the ‘tricks,’ be prosecuted also.
That means sending female undercover officers into the street as ‘decoys.’ I
have never come across any case, in any state, where, after the give and
take of the preliminary negotiations, and the passing or attempted passing
of the ‘buy money,’ the female undercover officer ever felt she had to get
the man to strip completely naked in front of her before she had enough
evidence to make an arrest!”131
D. Rebutting Common Views of the Judicial Role
In exercising their dismissal power in response to facets of the criminal
justice system’s size, harshness, and bias, judges are unsettling some
common conceptions about their role within criminal court and their
relationships with the prosecution.
Judges are often said to be virtually powerless in the face of
prosecutorial power and discretion, unable in the face of phenomena such
its commitment to neutral and independent adjudication and to a balanced adversary process.”). The
case involved Ms. Stewart’s refusal to answer questions regarding retainer information on the basis of
attorney–client privilege. Id. at 211.
125. People v. Cunningham, 431 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980).
126. People v. Neuberger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 256 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991).
127. Id. at 257.
128. Id. at 258.
129. State v. Thoreson, No. A06–454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *11 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27,
2007).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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as over-criminalization and over-incarceration to do anything other than
perhaps display some “leniency” at sentencing,132 or perhaps “streamline
[court] appearances.”133 Meanwhile, prosecutors are said to be
unrestrained,134 devoid of regulation in terms of charging practices,135
spending practices,136 or their interpretation (if any) of their duty to do
justice.137
What one sees in this case law, however, is the possibility (and
sometimes the reality) that judges can play a role that is “bold” and
“courageous.”138 These judges have the power to stand firm as gatekeepers
of the criminal law,139 monitoring its use and pushing back against its
overuse.140 In these cases, they stand “between the prosecutor and the

132. See Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66
ALA. L. REV. 871, 918 (2015) (“If the primary role of juries is to decide contested facts in criminal
cases, then the primary role of trial judges in those cases is to determine an appropriate sentence.”).
133. See Howell, supra note 92, at 293 (pointing to ways in which various players in the criminal
justice system could “reduce the harms that flow from the massive processing of minor cases through
the criminal courts,” and prescribing vis-à-vis judges that they “should streamline appearances so that
individuals who want to assert their right to trial need not make dozens of unnecessary court
appearances”).
134. See id. at 305 (“The only constraint on prosecutorial discretion is that prosecutors may not
exercise their discretion to target individuals based on impermissible criteria such as race.”); Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1655, 1655 (2010) (“[W]hen prosecutors decline or pursue charges for equitable reasons, they
exercise their prerogative unchecked.”); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 359–60 (2004) (“[C]ourts and legislatures have steadfastly refused to regulate
prosecutorial discretion.”); id. at 341 (“[P]rosecutors have unregulated discretion.”).
135. Brown, supra note 134, at 331 (mentioning “the complete lack of judicial scrutiny under
which prosecutors work in screening and charging cases”); Joseph Margulies, The Puzzle of Reform,
Part I, VERDICT (Mar. 21, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/03/21/the-puzzle-of-reform-part-I.
136. Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1503, 1517 (2015) (“Many of the costs of prosecution are currently externalized and, therefore,
provide no incentive to cabin those costs.”).
137. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Oversight: A National Dialogue in the Wake of Connick v.
Thompson, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.innocenceproject.org/prosecutorialoversight-national-dialogue-wake-connick-v-thompson/ (highlighting prosecutorial failures and lack of
accountability).
138. People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1980) (determinations under
New York’s in furtherance statute “evoke the true and unfortunately perceived of as old-fashioned,
sometimes courageous ‘judging’”); People v. Collier, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (“A
court must intervene boldly when unfairness. . . surfaces in a particular case. The purpose of CPL §
210.40 [and 170.40] is to interpose the court between the prosecution and the accused in an appropriate
case. The judiciary must never passively defer to the executive when the rights of the vulnerable are
impermissibly threatened. An independent judiciary must never fear the risk of retribution or the dismay
of traditionalists when it makes a decision or issues an opinion that it believes is right.”).
139. See State v. Hoffman, 695 A.2d 236 (N.J. 1997) (“[S]ome people may attempt to use the
process as a sword rather than as a shield. The judicial system must once again rely on the trial courts as
the gatekeeper.”); State v. Cabana, 716 A.2d 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (stating as to the de
minimis dismissal power that “[c]ommon sense prevails and this court must be the ‘gatekeeper’ in that
regard”).
140. See Pomorski, supra note 9, at 99 (“Since American law has been notoriously troubled by
overcriminalization, the decriminalizing potential of [MPC 2.12(2)] should be put to its fullest use.”).
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accused,”141 honoring (and sometimes citing) the legislators’ intent that
prosecutorial power not be “untrammeled.”142 Indeed, as envisaged by
California law, these statutes permit judges to grab the reins, “take[] charge
of the prosecution, and act[] for the people.”143
Through this dismissal power—and the fact that they exercise it144—
these judges demonstrate that there can be some oversight of the
prosecution’s use (or disuse) of its duty to do justice.145 Indeed, some case
law goes as far as to say that because of the impossibility of the
prosecution’s being both a partisan advocate and a neutral arbiter of what is
just, it is in effect only the judge who can and should exercise that latter
role. Thus, in voting to uphold the in furtherance of justice dismissal of a
“habitual criminal charge” that would have dictated an elevated sentence,
one Washington State Supreme Court Justice said the following:
[T]he district attorney cannot be regarded as impartial. He is
essentially an advocate who, believing in the justice of his cause, is
seeking conviction and punishment of the accused. To make him
also the court of last resort as to what punishment should be
imposed, without any impartial tribunal to review his decision in
the matter of sentencing, seems to me to do violence to our concept
of constitutional government, and offends our oft repeated and
proud boast that we are a government of law and not of men.146

141. Collier, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
142. State v. Carroll, 13 Conn. Supp. 112, 112 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1944) (“The purpose of the law
and the philosophy back of [Connecticut’s statute] was to prevent unchecked power by a prosecuting
attorney.”).
143. People v. More, 12 P. 631, 632 (Cal. 1887) (“The court, for the purposes of the order of
dismissal, takes charge of the prosecution, and acts for the people.”); id. (adding that as a result the
prosecution cannot appeal from such dismissals).
144. This power is analogous to the power of jury nullification to push for change. See Paul
Butler, supra note 97, at 724–25 (“I hope that there are enough of us out there, fed up with prison as the
answer to black desperation and white supremacy, to cause retrial after retrial, until, finally, the United
States ‘retries’ its idea of justice.”).
145. See Wanderer & Connors, supra note 27, at 846 (1999) (“The prosecutor is supposed to
examine the factors recognized in the de minimis and ‘interests of justice’ statutes and case law.”); id.
(“De minimis or ‘interests of justice’ statutes reflect a legislative will to recognize judicial authority to
oversee executive prosecutorial discretion—one example of a checks-and-balances framework with
which to achieve ultimate justice.”).
146. State v. Starrish, 544 P.2d 1, 9 (Wash. 1975) (Utter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting People v. Sidener, 375 P.2d 641, 660 (Cal. 1962)); see also Josh Bowers, supra note 134, at
1655 (“[S]everal reasons exist to believe that prosecutors are ill-suited to consider the normative merits
of potential charges. First, professional prosecutors fail sufficiently to individualize cases, lumping
them instead into legal boxes. Second, professional prosecutors prioritize institutional concerns over
equitable particulars.”); Andrew Inest, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for Its Application in
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 956 n.63 (“In theory, the state should undertake the same
analysis as would a court applying de minimis, and thus not prosecute cases that would qualify for the
defense. However, there are a number of reasons why this might not happen, including: (i) the fact that
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This same judge was explicit in affirming the judiciary’s power to
escape from the role of prosecutorial rubber-stamp. Washington’s statute
“makes the courts something more than the passive instruments of
prosecutorial policies.”147 It “ensures that the broad discretion of
prosecutors and the rigidity of aggravated sentencing laws will not combine
to reduce judges to the status of mere clerks assigned to stamp and file the
decisions of other agencies of government.”148
Trial judges in the state criminal court system are often said to be little
more than case processors149: workers on an assembly line, or perhaps just
the cogs.150 But in these cases we see judges who not only take
responsibility for, and attempt to uphold, their own integrity and that of the
criminal justice system,151 but also attempt to understand how the criminal
justice system interacts with other systems and pressures affecting
defendants. New York’s highest court noted that in dismissing prosecutions
for failure to provide child support, the trial court had “[e]mploy[ed] a
realism especially suitable in the context of an interest of justice
determination”:
[T]hree of the defendants . . . were in such indigent circumstances
that whatever opportunity there may have been to treat
constructively with their support obligations through the Family
Court would have been destroyed by their incarceration. One of
these three was a student dependent for his own sustenance on parttime work and grants. The fourth one, Brown, who had suffered a
heart attack, had attempted to clear up his support arrears only to
be repulsed by the District Attorney’s insistence on a finding of
guilt.152

prosecutors do not pay litigation costs from their own pockets, (ii) a prosecutor’s desire for a law-andorder reputation for use in a later election, and (iii) an honest difference of opinion concerning what
qualifies as trifling.”).
147. Starrish, 544 P.2d at 9 (Utter, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. See Sterling, supra note 122, at 2268 (“Particularly in high volume courts, like those that
hear misdemeanor and municipal cases, the first goal on the court’s agenda is case processing. Efficient
disposal of cases is often diametrical to nuanced, individualized examination of each defendant and the
full context and circumstances of that defendant’s life.”).
150. See Howell, supra note 92, at 290 (“The observation that what happens in the lower
criminal courts has little to do with justice is not new.”).
151. See State v. Thoreson, No. A06–454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *11 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10,
2007) (“Everyone on this case, law enforcement, public defender’s office, Hennepin County Attorney’s
Office, and the judiciary are part of the government. We are all, to some degree, bureaucrats. But we are
still allowed to define ourselves.”); State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Vt. 1995) (court dismissed
charge of sexual assault of a minor after a mistrial, thanks to its sense that the court is “responsible for
the integrity of the process as a whole”).
152. People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y. 1983).
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One sees the same emphasis on “realism” in an opinion dismissing a
manslaughter charge, where the court quoted with approval another judge,
who, in reviewing the case, had stated that to find that the defendant’s use
of defensive force was excessive would be “applying law in a vacuum,”153
and that “[s]uch approach is suitable for a laboratory setting but is
unsuitable for a world of real people where a person has been goaded
beyond endurance and his own safety may have been in jeopardy if this
bully had gotten the upper hand.”154
Part IV will explain that in these nineteen states, and in interpreting
numerous statutory provisions, judges frequently converge on these same
themes: that justice requires realism and context, or, in the words of
Aristotle, quoted in one of these cases, “no[t] this or that detail so much as
the whole story.”155 One may wonder what is suitable when “realism” is
not,156 but even if we agree that realism may be “especially suitable” in this
procedural realm,157 these cases should inspire us to consider opportunities
to introduce it in other parts of the criminal justice system too. This is in
part because of the limitations that this procedural context necessarily
involves, a subject to which this Article now turns.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THESE STATUTES
A thorough examination of these statutes must include an appreciation
of their limitations. It is an assessment of their limitations that will lead, in
Part IV, to a proposal that one seek additional fora in which the principles
relied upon in these cases might be applied. The limitations are important
for another reason too. They provide a case study of ways in which,
throughout the criminal justice system, defense protections tend to become
constrained, even in a context (here, potential dismissal of prosecutions)
that one might think would be nothing but useful to the defense. Four
limitations will be considered: first, the relative powerlessness of the
defense as regards this dismissal power; second, the phenomenon of reform
in one area leading to problems in another; third, judicial narrowing of this
power; and fourth, the risk of bias in the application of these statutes.

153. People v. Shanis, 374 N.Y.S.2d 912, 918 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
154. Id. at 919.
155. See id. at 923 (“Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less
about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he
meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so
much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been.”).
156. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d at 422 (stating that “realism” is “especially suitable” in the context of
these dismissal motions).
157. Id.
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A. Relative Powerlessness of the Defense
The relative powerlessness of the defense in this area is shown by the
fact that many states do not have these statutes on the books, and several of
those that do have them prohibit defense counsel from invoking them.158
That California has softened its stance so that defense counsel can
“informally suggest” dismissal,159 while not able explicitly to move for it,
may be symbolic of a justice system that masks rot with a facade of
adversarialism.160 Prosecutors can invoke these statutes for reasons that
include wanting more time to prosecute,161 more defendants,162 more
evidence,163 more charges,164 or more serious charges.165 Some courts have
pointed to a tension in the idea that prosecutors—the most dominant
participants in the system166—need yet another tool in order to get enough
and sufficiently serious convictions;167 one court has described as “sleight
of hand” the prosecution’s use of this statute to dismiss so that it could then
refile.168
Even where defense counsel is able to invoke these statutes, placing the
burden of seeking justice on the shoulders of defense counsel is
problematic in this time of unequal resources,169 massive public defender
caseloads,170 and meager standards of defense counsel effectiveness.171
158. Eight states indicate in their statutes that only the prosecutor or judge may move for
dismissal: Alaska, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon (though the case law
seems to permit a defendant’s motion. See State v. Hadsell, 878 P.2d 444 (Or. 1994)), and Washington.
In Iowa, this mechanism is “not available to a defendant” and the defense cannot even join in a
prosecutorial motion to dismiss. State v. Lasley, 705 N.W.2d 481 (Iowa 2005).
159. People v. Konow, 88 P.3d 36 (Cal. 2004).
160. See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011) (“The current American system is marked by an adversary
process so compromised by imbalance between the parties—in terms of resources and access to
evidence—that true adversary testing is virtually impossible.”).
161. See Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further is the Furtherance of Justice?,
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 417 (1991) (noting that these refilings “can circumvent the defendant’s
right to a speedy trial”).
162. See People v. Hernandez, 994 P.2d 354 (Cal. 2000).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1078 (2013).
167. See State v. Hart, 723 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Minn. 2006) (“We acknowledge that our
jurisprudence has created a tension between a district court’s authority to dismiss a complaint in the
interests of justice, and the prosecutor’s right, upon such a dismissal, to refile the complaint.”).
168. See State v. Avila, 153 P.3d 1195, 1202 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); Kles, supra note 161, at 417
(noting that these refilings “can circumvent the defendant’s right to a speedy trial”).
169. See Findley, supra note 160, at 912.
170. See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 581 (2014)
(public defenders have about six minutes per week per client).
171. See Natapoff, supra note 166, at 1049 (“[T]he right to counsel . . . cannot bear the curative
weight it has been assigned in the modern era of overcriminalization and mass judicial processing.”);
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Defense counsel may not have the time, ability, or resources to present a
compelling case for dismissal.172 Indeed, judges often hint, or more than
hint, that the case was ripe for a defense dismissal motion that was never
made.173
Even if defense counsel has the ability and willingness to file such a
motion, strategic considerations may act as a restraint. If one urges that
justice requires dismissal, one may be seen as urging that the prosecutor is
not doing her job; this or any other kind of “aggressive” litigation risks
jeopardizing a plea offer or other prosecutorial dispensation in this or
another case.174 In addition, if one makes such a motion one is liable to
prolong the case175—particularly if the prosecutor appeals a dismissal, as
they often do.176 Prolonging the case may be untenable for those who are
detained pre-trial,177 or for whom the pre-adjudication process is
destructive in other ways.178
In addition, with respect to many harms, these motions are available
only at too late a stage.179 The mere initiation of a prosecution can lead to
deportation, for example.180 In addition, there is often considerable pressure
to plead guilty at the first court appearance, before these motions can be
filed, and defendants are frequently unrepresented when they make the
Sterling, supra note 149, at 2250; id. at 2259 (“Although the [Strickland] test anticipates an objective
standard of reasonableness, the test has generally been interpreted as requiring an alarmingly low level
of competence.”); Rodney J. Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 739, 741–42 (2006) (describing assistance of counsel as often involving “little more than
counsel’s help in facilitating a guilty plea”).
172. See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom,
126 YALE L.J. 862, 879 (2017) (describing the “triage” that determines whether defense counsel will
file motions).
173. See State v. Lowe, 466 A.2d 866, 866 n.1 (Me. 1983); People v. Outsen, 7 N.Y.S.3d 859,
860 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2015); People v. Doe, 602 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510–511 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993); People v.
Donnaruma, 10 N.Y.S.3d 854, 855 (Albany City Ct. 2015); Commonwealth v. Kirkwood, 520 A.2d
451, 451 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
174. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 90 (1995).
175. See State v. Kinchen, 707 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Conn. 1998) (“Examining the basis of a
prosecution delays the criminal proceeding.”); People v. LaFont, 978 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2014) (dismissing a case after nine months against a woman alleged to have intervened when police
tried to handcuff her husband who had just had heart surgery).
176. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
177. See Natapoff, supra note 166, at 1051 (“Innocent defendants may plead guilty because they
cannot afford bail pending trial and will lose jobs, homes, or children by remaining incarcerated”).
178. See Benjamin Weiser & James C. McKinley, Jr., Chronic Bronx Court Delays Deny
TIMES
(May
10,
2016),
Defendants
Due
Process,
Suit
Says,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/nyregion/chronic-bronx-court-delays-deny-defendants-dueprocess-suit-says.html.
179. See Howell, supra note 92, at 291 (“The ready accessibility of electronic records can make
any arrest, even without a conviction, an effective bar to gainful employment.”).
180. See 5 Boro Defenders, Call for a Moratorium on Broken Windows Prosecutions, MEDIUM
(Jan. 30, 2017) https://medium.com/@5BoroDefenders/call-for-a-moratorium-on-broken-windowsprosecutions-729e3764411a.
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decision whether to accede.181 That pressure remains considerable if bail is
set at the first appearance—an event whose case-determinative nature has
led Jocelyn Simonson to analogize it to a trial,182 and, again, an event at
which there may be no counsel present.183 Even if a defense motion is
filed—and succeeds—before the case is resolved, devastating preadjudication harms accrue rapidly184 and cannot be undone.185 Thus, the
drafters’ description of the de minimis statute—that it gives the judiciary
the ability to “ignore merely technical violations of law”186—is somewhat
misleading. The judiciary may ignore the alleged violation, but only after
the law has imposed months- or years-long harms that cannot be erased.187
B. Reform Here Leading to Problems Elsewhere
Another reason to take a circumspect approach toward these statutes is
the risk that an apparent avenue of defendant protection creates problems
elsewhere within the system.
The first aspect of this risk is that by endorsing the notion of safety
valves for exceptional cases one reifies and helps to support the broader
system.188 As will be discussed below, judges often seem compelled to
181. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 369 (2011) (mentioning high rates of waiver of counsel in
misdemeanor cases, and high rates of guilty pleas after waiver in some jurisdictions).
182. See Simonson, supra note 98 at 585 (“[F]or indigent defendants [bail] often serves the
function that a real trial might, producing guilty pleas and longer sentences when an individual cannot
afford to pay their bail.”).
183. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Do Prosecutors Really Matter?: A Proposal to Ban OneSided Bail Hearings, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2016) (“[I]n about half the local jurisdictions in
this country arrested individuals appear at a pivotal hearing—the probable cause and bail hearing—and
face a judge and, in many cases, a prosecutor but with no defense counsel to speak on their behalf.”).
184. See Simonson, supra note 98, at 608 (“Even a few days in jail are profoundly destabilizing:
defendants experience declines in physical and mental health, and potentially lose wages, jobs, stable
housing, and custody of their children.”).
185. See People v. Doe, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6, 1979, at 12 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) (“[E]ven if the
defendant were to be acquitted after a trial, irreparable harm will have been done to his reputation by
virtue of the mere allegation that he was suspected of having propositioned one who purported to be a
street prostitute.”).
186. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 note (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
187. See Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1363 (2017) (mentioning
states that “do not expunge, seal, or remove dismissed charges from a person’s criminal history”).
188. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, When the City Posts Bail, (manuscript at 13) (on file with
author) (“[C]ertain reform efforts may sometimes legitimate the systems they are trying to change by
instituting small changes that appear to shift things more than they do. These deceptively small changes
can, in turn, make it hard to criticize the larger system, solidifying fidelity to the practices and ideas that
cause the injustice in the first place.”); see also Jaisal Noor, Judge Dismisses Case Against Rebel Diaz,
(June
22,
2009)
Says
“Keep
Up
the
Good
Work,”
INDYPENDENT
https://indypendent.org/2009/06/judge-dismisses-case-against-rebel-diaz-says-keep-up-the-good-work/
(describing dismissal in furtherance of justice ordered after the submission of letters of support from
over thirty members of the South Bronx community in which the defendants were based, and quoting
one of the defendants as saying that “[t]he outcome of the case, it’s really easy to come to the
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confine this remedy to what they view as exceptional cases.189 These
dismissals, therefore, risk assuaging concerns about (and diluting efforts to
tackle aspects of) the broader system, by suggesting that an escape exists
for the deserving few.190 One way of understanding the de minimis
dismissal power is as an aspect of the judge’s power to avoid absurd
results.191 Under this reading, these cases would be making an implicit
assertion that in those cases where dismissal is not granted the status quo is
not absurd.192
The second aspect of this risk is that this backstop to the prosecutorial
duty to do justice may incline the prosecution still further to neglect the
subsidiary duty to refrain from bringing or pursuing certain cases.193 The
same phenomenon might work to decrease pressure on police to take steps
other than to initiate charges. In New Jersey, for example, the drafters of
the state’s de minimis statute were alert to the risk that rather than
prompting other players within the criminal justice system to more
awareness of their discretionary power, this judicial power might allow
them to relax their focus. The Commentary states that “[i]t should be made
clear that this Section is intended as an additional area of discretion in the
administration of the criminal law by way of judicial participation and not
as a replacement for the traditional exercise of discretion by the prosecutor,
the grand jury and the police. The Section should not be used by those
agencies as an excuse for buck-passing.”194
Case law suggests that there is indeed a risk of buck-passing. In its
brief rejecting a claim that Pennsylvania’s Trademark Counterfeiting
conclusion that the system works. . . . I would say it’s not so much that the system works, [but] that the
system has cracks. As a community we have to exploit those cracks in the system. We need to find the
small spaces of democracy that are left within this police state, whether through technology, through
direct action through our communities, within our block.”).
189. See infra Part C.
190. See Joseph Margulies, The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, BOS. REV. (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://bostonreview.net/us/joseph-margulies-criminal-justice-transformation
(“[R]eform
proposals
aimed at population rather [than] principle are dangerously incomplete. We may say that children
should not be tried as adults, and the mentally ill should not be held in solitary confinement. But
solutions such as these reinforce the idea that everyone else deserves to rot.”); id. (stating that under this
mindset “[n]othing else in the system—from policing to prosecution, from prison conditions to
collateral consequences—needs to change”).
191. See Wanderer & Connors, supra note 27, at 849 n.92.
192. See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, We Need to Talk About an Injustice, TED (Feb. 2012) at 6:34,
https://www.ted.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_about_an_injustice/transcript?language=
en (“Our system isn’t just being shaped in these ways that seem to be distorting around race, they’re
also distorted by poverty. We have a system of justice in this country that treats you much better if
you’re rich and guilty than if you’re poor and innocent. Wealth, not culpability, shapes outcomes.”).
193.
Paul Butler, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/opinion/gideons-muted-trumpet.html (opining that the duty to do
justice is “just words on paper”).
194. N.J. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM’N, THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION 75 (1971).
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Statute violated the First Amendment because it might sweep in such
benign behavior as a “lawyer writing [Penn State in] a brief,” or a “toddler
painting Penn State on her tree house,” the State made the following
argument: “[E]ven assuming such minimal behavior is prohibited, the
Commonwealth has established protections . . . regarding [d]e minimus
[sic] infractions. This permits courts to dismiss charges which may fall
within the technical language of the statute, but is not in which [sic] the
statute intended to prohibit and punish.”195 The state’s Supreme Court
rejected this use of the de minimis statute as a security blanket:
[W]e find no comfort in the existence of [the state statute]
providing for the dismissal of de minimis infractions, as the
concern of our overbreath [sic] jurisprudence is not directed only at
the risk of prosecution under overly broad statutes but also at the
chilling of speech in fear of prosecution . . . . Our citizens are
provided no guarantee that a court will find that the de minimis
statute applies to their use of “counterfeit marks.”196
C. Judicial Narrowing
Another phenomenon that is prominent in this context is judicial
narrowing of the protection mentioned in the statutes. The cases often
emphasize that a high bar must be met in order for a dismissal to be
appropriate. Where it is explained, the high bar is said to be required by the
separation of powers.197 New York’s case law has been particularly vocal
on this point in interpreting the statutory language that limits dismissal to
cases where it is required by “some compelling factor, consideration or
circumstance.”198 New York judges have declared that these dismissals
occur only because of “the tiniest crack that allows a sliver of discretion to
shine through when Justice cries out for mercy in spite of the strict
application of the law.”199 These dismissals are to occur only when justified
by “an overriding moral issue,”200 or the risk of a “miscarriage of
justice,”201 or “shock [to] the conscience.”202 In the opinion of one court,
195. Brief for Appellant at 12–13, Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179 (Pa. 2009) (No. 20
MAP 2008), 2008 WL 6090125, at *12–13.
196. Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179, 188 (Pa. 2009).
197. See People v. Izsak, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979); State v. Sauve, 666
A.2d 1164, 1167 (Vt. 1995) (“[B]ecause of separation-of-powers considerations and the public’s
interest in the prosecution of those charged with criminal offenses, the trial court’s discretion to dismiss
cases in the interest of justice is necessarily limited.”).
198. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.40(1), 210.40(1) (McKinney 2007).
199. People v. Thomas, 998 N.Y.S.2d 612, 617 (Ithaca City Ct. 2014).
200. People v. Stern, 372 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975).
201. People v. Vurckio, 619 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).
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“the Legislature used the word ‘compelling’ as a means to put the judiciary
on notice to use this section as sparingly as garlic.”203 (Of course, it is far
from uncontroversial that the use of garlic should be sparing.204)
The judicial narrowing has included a carving out of certain categories
of defendants as ineligible for this relief. For example, some case law has
declared that a prior record—generally, one or more prior convictions,205
but sometimes just one or more arrests206—precludes dismissal.207 Thus, in
one case involving misdemeanor charges against AIDS activists who were
alleged to have sat in the middle of a Manhattan intersection, the trial judge
dismissed the charges against those with “no record of prior unlawful
activity,” but not those with such a record.208
Similarly, some courts have determined that, despite the absence of
statutory language to this effect, certain criminal charges are categorically
ineligible for this sort of dismissal. Categories deemed unsuitable by one or
more jurisdictions include negligent homicide,209 drug offenses,210
“violent” offenses,211 “drunk driving,”212 and felonies.213 As Pomorski
points out, even in the de minimis context these blanket carve-outs are less
sensible than they may at first appear given that the definition of de
minimis in the MPC and the state statutes that follow it is not tied to the
formal grading of an alleged offense.214
202. People v. A.T., 589 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
203. Stern, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
204. See, e.g., The Top Five Reasons to Add Garlic to Everything, INST. NAT. HEALING (Sep. 20,
2013),
https://www.institutefornaturalhealing.com/2013/09/the-top-5-reasons-to-add-garlic-toeverything/.
205. See State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 238 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (“Defendant has no
prior history of arrest or conviction. Were the contrary true that fact would militate against dismissal of
the complaint.”).
206. See People v. Spagnola, 855 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (affirming dismissal
where “no prior history of arrests”).
207. This restriction of course has a racially disparate impact.
208. People v. Ben Levi, 565 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990).
209. State v. Johnson, 653 P.2d 428, 436–37 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982).
210. See State v. Sorge, 591 A.2d 1382, 1385 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (denying motion
to dismiss charges relating to needle exchange where such activity “is contrary to the zero tolerance
drug policy of this State which refuses to treat as trivial the possession of even the most minuscule
amounts of a controlled dangerous substance”).
211. See State v. Downey, 576 A.2d 945, 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (“Even under an
expansive reading of the de minimis statute, [a direct intentional physical attack] should not be
classified as trivial.”).
212. See Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 616 A.2d 1019, 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[T]his court
will not undermine our state’s policy against drunk driving by declaring appellant’s acts ‘de
minimis.’”).
213. See Commonwealth v. Przybyla, 722 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
214. See Pomorski, supra note 9, at 99. (“The concept of trivial felony is not necessarily
internally contradictory considering that the rationale of the de minimis doctrine is overcoming the
conflict between the formal, legal assessment of general classes of conduct on the one hand, and the
substantive assessment of concrete, individual acts on the other.”); id. (noting that some case law holds
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Some courts have also indicated that dismissal is appropriate only
where no “intermediate and less drastic remedial steps” were available,215
despite the absence of statutory language to this effect. In Oregon, for
example, the in furtherance statute makes no mention of a requirement that
intermediate measures first be sought.216 One court, however, imported
such a requirement from a different area of the law, finding “no intention
by the legislature that [the court’s] authority [in this area] should not be
circumscribed by the same policies.”217
In Washington, various aspects of judicial narrowing led, in turn, to
narrowing of the rule itself.218 The 1973 version of the rule stated that
“[t]he court on its own motion in the furtherance of justice, after notice and
hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution and shall set forth its
reasons in a written order.”219 It thus “appear[ed] to grant largely unfettered
discretion to the trial court to dismiss a criminal prosecution.”220 The case
law then “severely restrict[ed] this discretion”;221 these judicial restrictions
were in turn used to justify a 1995 amendment,222 which imported each of
the restrictions (shown here in italics): “The court, in the furtherance of
justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due
to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been
prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused’s
right to a fair trial.”223 The cases have subsequently narrowed the scope of
this remedy even further, holding that dismissal can occur only when there
have been “truly egregious cases of mismanagement or misconduct by the
prosecutor.”224
One also sees judicial narrowing in the appellate context. Courts have
ostensibly given leeway to trial judges, declaring that the standard of
open the possibility of a de minimis dismissal of a felony prosecution); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 260–61 (1966) (“Every crime, however precisely its boundaries are
drawn, may cover violations of very different gravity.”).
215. State v. Leonel-Castillo, 150 Wash. App. 1027 (2009) (reversing dismissal ordered after
prosecutor had failed to appear for trial, where court did not first consider proceeding with another
prosecutor or any other alternative).
216. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2003).
217. State v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 977 P.2d 400, 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that it was
error for trial court to dismiss for discovery violations when a lesser sanction would suffice).
218. Compare with New York, where the “exceptionally serious” statutory requirement for law
enforcement conduct was imported from the case law. See Wirenius, supra note 25, at 202.
219. State v. Rohrich, 71 P.3d 638, 641 n.3 (Wash. 2003) (alteration in original).
220. Id. at 641 (alteration in original) (quoting the drafters’ comment to the 1995 amendment).
221. Id. (alteration in original).
222. See id.
223. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3(b) (emphasis added). The language added was said to be
“insubstantial in that it merely reflects preexisting common law requirements for dismissing charges.”
State v. Michielli, 937 P.2d 587, 592 (Wash. 1997).
224. State v. Ashley, 122 Wash. App. 1045, 1047 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting State v.
Duggins, 844 P.2d 441, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)).
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review is abuse of discretion.225 Judges and commentators have noted,
however, that the standard that ends up being applied—at least where the
decision below was to grant the motion to dismiss226—looks a lot like de
novo review,227 or even automatic reversal.228 Indeed, in some instances the
very granting of appeals from these dismissals appears to have come about
through judicial stretching. In Minnesota, for example, statutory language
declares that the prosecutor cannot appeal dismissals in the interests of
justice.229 At least one case, however, managed to find the ability to appeal
by looking at a different statute.230 And prosecutors do appeal,231 with the
result that a dispute over, for example, an alleged sip of beer enjoyed by a
twenty-year-old, can prompt rounds and rounds of litigation.232
Several of these acts of judicial narrowing have garnered dissent. Thus,
in Oregon, one dissenting judge pointed out that dismissals are reviewed in
a more intrusive way than the “abuse of discretion” label would suggest.233
In Washington, one judge objected to the majority’s apparent restriction of
dismissal to contexts where a due process violation is found, noting that
225. See State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Vt. 1995); Pomorski, supra note 9, at 88–89.
226. See People v. Gragert, 765 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003).
227. See Pomorski, supra note 9, at 88–89 (“In some instances, in spite of declarations to the
contrary, appellate courts have substituted their own concept of a de minimis infraction for the one
applied by the decision appealed from. Thus, operationally, the review was conducted de novo . . . .”);
Wirenius, supra note 25, at 205 (“[I]n the decade and a half in which the revised [New York] statute has
held sway, review has become more exacting. While the vast bulk of the pre-amendment reversals of
dismissals involved lower court failure to follow the appropriate procedures, appellate division reversals
increasingly rest on simple disagreement.”).
228. See State v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 977 P.2d 400, 407 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (Warren, S.J.,
dissenting) (“In this case, the trial court clearly reviewed our decisions and carefully considered the
issues that we have held to be important before it decided to dismiss this case. The majority holds,
nevertheless, that the court abused its discretion. The majority thereby makes express the implication
that the state draws from our cases: if a trial court dismisses a case over the state’s objection, it will be
reversed, no matter how carefully the court has followed our teachings.”).
229. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.04(1)(1) (“[A] pretrial order cannot be appealed . . . if the court
dismissed a complaint under Minn. Stat. § 631.21.”).
230. See State v. Hudson, No. A13–1635, 2014 WL 684710, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 24,
2014) (“Although there is no authority for an appeal of a dismissal [in furtherance of justice] under
[Minn. Stat. §] 631.21, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 105 provides for discretionary review in the interests of
justice. . . . Under the unique circumstances of this case, where the district court’s dismissal was based
on both a lack of probable cause and ‘in furtherance of justice,’ the state has demonstrated a
‘compelling reason’ why discretionary review [of the furtherance of justice dismissal] and consolidation
are appropriate.” (alterations in original)).
231. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome
Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 315, 366 (2012)
(stating that because of motivation to defend the status quo, prosecutors will “too often close their eyes
to evidence that the status quo is undesirable, thus failing to acknowledge . . . the validity of defense
claims that justice requires something other than the harsh penalties law enforcement seeks”).
232. See State v. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d 284, 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (involving defense
appeal of conviction, followed by prosecution appeal of subsequent dismissal).
233. See Vasquez-Hernandez, 977 P.2d at 407 (Warren, S.J., dissenting) (“[O]ur decisions under
ORS 135.755 are unusual because we nominally apply an abuse of discretion standard but in fact
routinely reverse trial courts when they dismiss cases over the state’s objection.”).
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“[j]ustice may well require dismissal even where the State’s conduct is not
so extreme as to violate constitutional due process standards.”234 Another
objected to the majority’s creation of a requirement that there be
“egregious” governmental misconduct in order to justify a dismissal,
saying the following:
[T]he majority’s threshold requirement of egregiousness is not
found in the plain language of CrR 8.3(b). . . . To hold that the
misconduct must not only prejudice the defendant but also be
“egregious” signals this court will tolerate some prosecutorial
mismanagement resulting in prejudice to a defendants’ [sic]
constitutional right to a fair trial. Moreover, the majority misses the
obvious point: if misconduct causes prejudice to a defendant’s right
to a fair trial it is egregious for just that reason.235
D. Bias
A final limitation on the promise of these statutes is that the decision
(not only by the judge, but also potentially by the defense attorney236 and
prosecutor237) to pluck a case out of the pile and scrutinize its suitability for
prosecution is necessarily subjective. It hinges on the question of whether
the plight of the defendant resonates with a human decision maker, and
thus it is vulnerable to arbitrariness and bias.238 “Appellant is somebody’s

234. State v. Cantrell, 758 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Wash. 1988) (Dore, J., dissenting).
235. State v. Wilson, 65 P.3d 657, 664 (Wash. 2003) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
236. See Rapping, supra note 12, at 1020 (describing how “through their subconscious
assumptions about their clients, what the evidence against them means, and what consequences are
appropriate, defenders can be pushed to accept a lower standard of justice, and to fight a little less
aggressively, for their clients of color”).
237. See Fairfax, supra note 13, at 1275 (“Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny
punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that society’s most fundamental sanctions will be
imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the least favored members of the community—racial and
ethnic minorities, social outcasts, the poor—will be treated most harshly.”); MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW 115 (2010) (“Numerous studies have shown that prosecutors interpret and respond
to identical criminal activity differently based on the race of the offender.”)
238. See Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A
Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment
Discrimination and Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 760–61 (2012) (“While judges
strive to apply the law fairly and impartially, they are human and therefore must view things through
their own cognitive lenses—judges, like all humans, are not free from biases. . . . [I]mplicit biases . . .
‘strongly influence how courts decide particular cases . . . .’” (quoting Michael Selmi, Why Are
Employment Discrimination Claims So Hard to Win?, LA. L. REV. 555, 562 (2001))); Richardson,
supra note 172, at 875 (“[R]acialized justice is a foreseeable consequence of systemic triage [that is, a
“situation of pressurized decision making by all courtroom actors”] because of the influence of implicit,
i.e. unconscious, racial biases on behaviors, perceptions, and judgments.”); id. at 877 (noting that
implicit biases flourish when decision making is “highly discretionary”).
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daughter. I have a daughter,”239 said one judge who deemed a prostitution
charge to be an appropriate one for dismissal,240 and who in this statement
hinted at the importance of a sense of human connection. Mocking the
notion that it was a legitimate police tactic for the undercover officer to ask
the defendant to take all her clothes off, under the theory that “good girls
won’t do that but bad girls will,” he appeared to drift into memories of
happier times: “Maybe nobody was ever 19, went to college, went to
fraternity and sorority parties, and in a large group both male and coed,
ceremoniously ‘mooned’ their school’s arch rival football team as it drove
into the parking lot or, for that matter, tried to moon their arch rival’s entire
student body until the college president sent security in,” he mused.241
In an effort to combat arbitrariness in these adjudications, both New
York and the MPC introduced a set of factors that courts are to apply.242
Yet these factors often bend in either direction,243 and thus the importance
of capturing the spirit of the individual decision maker remains. Even while
the case law decries the notion that a judge should act as “a knight-errant,
roaming at will in pursuit of his (or her) own ideal of beauty or of
goodness,”244 we seem to see a paean to beauty and goodness in a recent
case involving graffiti charges. The defendant was charged with spray
painting a pink fairy on the sidewalk outside an elementary school on a
June day.245 It turns out that the judge had a favorite piece of public graffiti,
just across from the courthouse.246 And the notion of a pink fairy—“a
sprinkle of joyous whimsy”—delighting the school children,247 and yet
leading to the caging of its creator, inspired the judge not only to engage in
a literary creation of his own (his opinion is sprinkled with fairy-related
quotes), but also to dismiss.248

239. State v. Thoreson, No. A06–454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *11 (Minn. Ct. App. April 10,
2007).
240. Id.
241. Id. at *9.
242. See Wirenius, supra note 25, at 202.
243. See Wanderer & Connors, supra note 27, at 850.
244. See People v. Stewart, 656 N.Y.S.2d 210, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (quoting BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 62 (1921)) (reversing dismissal of indictment
against Lynne Stewart).
245. People v. Thomas, 998 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (Ithaca City Ct. 2014).
246. Id. at 615 (“This Court’s favorite public graffiti is just a few steps across from the
courthouse on the Green Street garage.”).
247. Id. (“The Court can only imagine the laughs ringing musically through the late Spring
morning air as children were welcomed by this spritely visage as they entered their school on one of
those painstakingly long June days before the start of summer vacation.”).
248. Id.
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Judges draw not only on their individual experience in justifying these
dismissals, but also on “our collective experiences.”249 “In our collective
experiences . . . we have all observed two workers or friends or a parent
and child arguing when one may firmly grab the arm of the other to direct
action or emphasize a point;”250 we lawyers reading and deciding cases can
all imagine the rage and frustration one might feel if a sibling were to
snatch away an unopened letter from a law school admissions office.251 But
our collective experiences have their limits, and neither judges nor lawyers
represent our nation’s diversity.252 Commentators note, for example, a
judicial reluctance to grant dismissals in cases involving HIV and AIDS.253
Real or perceived barriers in race, sexual orientation, class, and/or health
status may prove too hard to overcome.
Research into implicit social cognition reveals a fundamental problem
with the kinds of considerations that seem to move judges to dismiss.254 As
one judge has phrased it, “Ultimately an application in the interests of
justice represents an appeal to one judge’s individual conscience. We
cannot find it within ourselves to reject our own moral belief that ultimate
protection of Society is best achieved where at all possible by total
rehabilitation of the one human being standing before us whose very
presence calls out that he or she is human, unique and worth at least some
effort—and faith—on our part.”255 The problem is that each of the
assessments mentioned here—assessments of humanity,256 of

249. See State v. Cabana, 716 A.2d 576, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997); People v. Gragert,
765 N.Y.S.2d 471, 475 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003) (dismissing charges relating to street protest, where
inconvenience caused “could not have been that much more than the routine inconvenience we endure
in this city on a regular basis”).
250. Cabana, 716 A.2d at 578.
251. See Watson v. United States, 979 A.2d 1254, 1263 (D.C. 2009) (using as a hypothetical
example of a case ripe for de minimis dismissal the scenario where “[a] letter from the admissions office
of a law school, addressed to John, a college senior, arrives in the mail at John’s home. John retrieves
the letter. Harry, John’s twin brother, who has also applied to law school and is desperate to see if John
was admitted, snatches it from him. John pushes Harry to the ground and takes back the letter.”).
252. See Robinson, supra note 52, at 416 (1988); Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking,
Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693, 702 (2014) (“In state trial courts, 86
percent of judges are white.”); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 42 (2010), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racialdiscrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf (“Just 4.2% of lawyers and judges in the United States are AfricanAmerican.”).
253. See Wirenius, supra note 25, at 218.
254. Explicit bias in decisions whether to grant dismissals is also a concern. See In re Stacey, 737
N.W.2d 345, 346 (Minn. 2007) (noting that a judge committed an ethical violation by continuing for
dismissal a traffic ticket issued to court employee’s husband); Richardson, supra note 172, at 887
(“[T]he enormous discretion wielded by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges facilitates racial bias,
both conscious and implicit.”).
255. People v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979).
256. See Robert J. Smith & Ben Cohen, Capital Punishment: Choosing Life or Death
(Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 229, 236–38 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J.
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uniqueness,257 of worth258—is vulnerable to implicit bias. Those from
disfavored groups may not call out to the judge that they are human;259
those from favored groups may—through the “boost” of implicit
favoritism260—call out with particular clarity. This same phenomenon—
implicit bias that favors some groups and disfavors others—affects each of
the other considerations that emerge from these opinions as components of
a “conscientious” determination: assessments of, and response to, harm,261
wrong,262 and pain suffered;263 empathy;264 and assessments of character,265
dangerousness,267
blameworthiness,268
redemption
seriousness,266
Smith, eds., 2012) (implicit racial bias can pollute jury consideration of mitigating evidence by
dehumanizing black defendants or fostering empathy for white defendants).
257.
See Roberts, supra note 101, at 877 (racial difference can lead to a lack of attention to
unique characteristics).
258. See Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 269, 277 (2015) (“[I]mplicit associations between race and the value of life predict a
greater likelihood of giving death sentences to Black defendants in capital cases.”).
259. Phillip A. Goff, Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and
Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 304–05 (2008) (finding
implicit associations between “black” and “ape,” and explaining that such associations facilitate
acceptance of harsher treatment and punishment of blacks within the criminal justice system).
260. See Smith et al., supra note 132, at 891 (describing implicit white favoritism as “a sort of
automatic boost that one receives on account of his whiteness”).
261. See Smith & Cohen, supra note 256, at 240 (“[T]he favorable implicit biases that flow
toward white victims enhance the perceived harm of the crime when the victim is white.”). For the
centrality of calculation of harm to the de minimis issue, see Watson v. United States, 979 A.2d 1254,
1265 (D.C. 2009).
262. See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision
Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 589 (2011) (“Race-based belief in a group’s
‘badness’ . . . makes it easier to ignore the possible flaws in the legal processes by which its members
are blamed and punished for their transgressions.”).
263. See Smith et al., supra note 132, at 875 (“Social scientists have linked implicit favoritism
to . . . the degree of empathic response to human pain.”).
264. See Lynch & Haney, supra note 262, at 584 (“[T]he racial disparities that we found in
sentencing outcomes were likely the result of the jurors’ inability or unwillingness to empathize with a
defendant of a different race—that is, White jurors who simply could not or would not cross the
‘empathic divide’ to fully appreciate the life struggles of a Black capital defendant and take those
struggles into account in deciding on his sentence.”); Richardson, supra note 172, at 883 (“Empathy
sensitizes people to injustice . . . .”); Smith et al., supra note 132, at 899 (“Research from social,
cognitive, and neuropsychology has found that empathy is experienced more for in-group members than
out-group members.”). Smith et al., supply a helpful definition of “empathy,” explaining that it is used
by social scientists to mean “the ability to understand and vicariously share the feelings and thoughts of
other people.” Id.
265. Smith et al., supra note 132, at 912 (describing influence of implicit white favoritism on
character assessments).
266. See Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop & Lori Pfingst, Race, Drugs, and Policing:
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 106 (2006) (“[R]acial
stereotypes shape perceptions of the seriousness or dangerousness of particular situations and social
problems.”).
267. See Samuel R. Sommers & Satia Marotta, Racial Disparities in Legal Outcomes: On
Policing, Charging Decisions, and Criminal Trial Proceedings, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 103, 108 (2014) (“Defendant race can subtly influence jurors’ expectations about
culpability, dangerousness, and credibility.”).

2 ROBERTS 327-380 (DO NOT DELETE)

364

11/14/2017 8:30 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 69:2:327

potential,269 and common sense.270 If these dismissals depend on judicial
feelings of “I’ve been there, and I know what that feels like,” then
defendants of relative privilege are likely to do particularly well.271
The findings of implicit social cognition are supported by the data that
exist in connection with the granting of this kind of motion.272 This is not to
suggest that this remedy should be abolished. Abolition might heighten
disparity, since for those of even greater privilege it may be that a kind of
sub rosa de minimis dismissal occurs—phrased differently, various kinds
of safety valves or escape valves may exist273—before charges are even
filed,274 when those with privilege slide office supplies into our bags,275 for
example, or cash across the table to those who care for our children,276 and
have little reason to fear prosecution.

268. See Lynch & Haney, supra note 262, at 588 (“[I]t is easier to believe that people from
already disfavored—here, racially stigmatized—groups have done bad things if belief in their inherent
‘badness’ is part of their stigma.”); id. at 589 (“[B]ecause out-groups are more feared and despised to
begin with[,] it may be easier for decision makers to exaggerate the seriousness of the things that these
already disfavored persons have been found guilty of doing.”).
269. See Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the
Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 527 (2009) (“When Blacks are unfairly ‘taxed’ in
the criminal system with perceived criminality, Whites receive an undeserved ‘credit’ with a perceived
innocence or worthiness of redemption.”).
270. See State v. Cabana, 716 A.2d 576, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (identifying
common sense as relevant to dismissal determinations); Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of
Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE &
ETHICS 278, 305 (2014) (“Requiring judges to use their judicial experience and common sense may be a
license to invoke implicit biases.”).
271. See Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias
on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 565 (2014) (“[I]n-group
members, and specifically White Americans, benefit from their group membership in a variety of ways.
For example, in-group members display increased empathy towards each other . . . and receive the
cognitive benefit of the doubt in a range of . . . situations, simply by virtue of their group
membership.”).
272. See Christopher Schmitt, Plea Bargaining Favors Whites as Blacks, Hispanics Pay Price,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 8, 1991, at 1A (finding racial disparity in dismissals in the interests of
justice).
273. See Pomorski, supra note 9, at 99 (police “exercise de facto power of decriminalization by a
practice of selective enforcement or nonenforcement”).
274. See, e.g., Abi Wilkinson, White and Rich—the Justice System Gives You a Pass. What
(Oct.
27,
2016,
7:57
AM),
About
Everyone
Else?,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/27/white-youngsters-make-mistakes-policejustice-committee.
275. See STUART GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 168 (2012) (noting that as many as 60% of all American employees admit to having
taken office supplies from work for personal use).
276. See Catherine Rampell, How Common is Tax Evasion?, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Feb. 3,
2009, 8:12 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/how-common-is-tax-evasion/?_r=0
(describing 80–95% rate of violation of household employer tax rules).
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IV. THE POWER OF THESE CASES AS A GROUP
This Part brings together Part II’s discussion of the potential of
individual dismissals and Part III’s discussion of the limitations on the
dismissal power. It suggests that one can read these cases not just to see the
individual attempts at justice that they represent, but also to extract the
composite vision that they contain. This composite vision—revealed by
drawing together the principles relied upon by the judges ordering
dismissal—has potential applicability far beyond this procedural context,277
and thus potentially beyond some of the constraints described in Part III.
Part IV.A extracts four principles of justice from the case law and
explains how they can be woven together to create a composite vision of a
different kind of criminal justice system. Part IV.B suggests that it may be
that some of the constraints operating in this procedural context—the role
of empathy, and a sense that the ramifications of a ruling would be tightly
limited—helped to enable the declaration of these principles, but that there
is no logical reason to confine them to this context. It thus suggests that if
the principles, and the broader vision that they yield, resonate in this
context, one should begin the project of considering their broader
applicability.
A. Principles of Justice Upon Which the Cases Converge
Judges in multiple states, interpreting multiple statutory provisions,
repeatedly converge on the same principles of justice. Each of these
principles has in common a theme that the court is considering more than
just a decontextualized account of what the defendant is alleged to have
done.278 Each of these principles has had scholarly proponents, but those
proponents have not been able to point to much real-world support.279 The
cases provide important data indicating that these principles were
sufficiently compelling to persuade a variety of judges to exercise this
significant power. This Part will examine each of the following principles:
consideration of other mechanisms of accountability before the criminal
law, consideration of the role of the state in the alleged law-breaking, a
holistic calculation of costs imposed by prosecution, and consideration of
defendants’ motives.

277. See Douglas Husak, The De Minimis ‘Defense’ to Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 328, 389 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011) (stating that issues
raised by de minimis dismissals implicate fundamental concepts within criminal law).
278. See Oliver & Batra, supra note 46, at 83 (“Courts generally dismiss cases under [the de
minimis] statute only after considering all of the facts of the crime alleged as well as the circumstances
of the defendant’s life more generally.”).
279. See supra note 9.
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1. Criminal Law as Last Resort
In many of these cases, judges appear to be motivated by the notion
that criminal law should be the last resort. One sees judges dismissing cases
in favor of a range of mechanisms that they find as suitable as—or more
suitable than280—the criminal law to achieve the relevant priorities.281
Thus, judges terminated the following cases: a prosecution for assault
where the complainant mostly just wanted compensation for her gunshot
wound, and could get that through an insurance claim;282 the prosecution of
attorney Lynne Stewart for criminal contempt, where civil contempt was
more likely to get results, and less likely to destroy her career;283
prosecutions for failure to pay child support, where there was a framework
set up for that purpose in the family court system, which again, was more
likely to achieve legitimate purposes and less likely to destroy;284
prosecutions against doctors for alleged mistreatment of patients, where the
State Board of Medicine had already reviewed the case and issued
sanctions;285 riot charges against prisoners where they had been “dealt with
administratively,”286 and a prosecution for assault in the form of a political
candidate allegedly pushing his rival during a heated exchange about the
rival’s flier on the dance floor of a Marriott hotel at the end of a long
campaign.287 “Not all inappropriate behavior leads to criminal liability,”288
said the court in that last case: “There are instances, such as this, where
public opinion will be the better judge of conduct.”289 Another judge took
the opportunity to suggest non-arrest methods that the police might have
attempted: rather than press ahead with efforts to get a suspected prostitute
280. See People v. Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d 936, 949 (Syracuse City Ct. 1980), rev’d, 459 N.Y.S.2d
344 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1981) (“Society suffers in that a more costly and less efficient process has been
utilized, in two instances without resort ever having been made to the comprehensive Family Court
System. . . . This Court does not possess the expertise, nor the jurisdiction, to adequately investigate all
the necessary ingredients of support. Nor does this Court have the power to enforce the orders of
support established in Family Court.”).
281. Id. (“In effect, to continue these prosecutions would be to deprive both the defendants and
their ‘victims’ of a more meaningful resolution of the non-support dilemma.”).
282. People v. Jacobs, 432 N.Y.S.2d 614, 619–20 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1980).
283. People v. Stewart, 656 N.Y.S.2d 210, 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (mentioning the risk of
“catastrophic and largely irreparable professional consequences of a conviction for criminal contempt”).
284. See Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 948 (“A criminal conviction on a previously unblemished
record can accomplish little more than impede any potential increases in earning capacity.”). Of course,
the civil system for enforcing child support orders can still result in incarceration. See Turner v. Rogers,
564 U.S. 431 (2011).
285. See Commonwealth v. Byers, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 506, 520 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1999).
286. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 510 A.2d 1389, 1391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); see also
Commonwealth v. Matty, 619 A.2d 1383, 1388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“[I]f another area of the law
effectively dispels the need for conviction, the prosecution should be dismissed as unnecessary.”).
287. See State v. Cabana, 716 A.2d 576, 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997).
288. Id.
289. Id. (“The what, why and how of which may call for an apology, not criminal charges.”).
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to take off her shirt so that he could arrest her, the officer could instead
have said:
Jenny, this isn’t your day. Go on home and get a good night’s
sleep. Just tell me what bus stop to drive you to and I will, and if
you are truly broke, I can spot you a couple of bucks for bus fare.
Now listen to me, I have got about four hours left on my shift, and
if I see you again hustling on the street corners, then I will have to
run you in.290
Courts are particularly eager to invoke their role as gatekeepers of the
criminal law when they detect that rather than a legitimate use of the
criminal law, “something else is going on.” Thus, a theft prosecution of a
police officer was dismissed where the court detected that “there are
internal problems the Pennsylvania State Police has with this officer.
Whatever those problems might be, this Court is not going to allow the
Criminal Justice System to be the forum in which to sort out that
problem.”291 In another case, a prosecution was dismissed on the basis that
a bank had “improperly used the criminal justice system to collect a
debt.”292
These cases thus serve as a useful reminder that the criminal law may
have become, and should not be, a default response,293 and serve to
demonstrate that there are other mechanisms that can meet some or all of
the ends in relation to which the criminal law is justified,294 without the
devastating harms. Indeed, it is not only the case that the criminal law may
be unnecessary in order to meet certain goals with which it is commonly
associated: it may actively thwart their realization.295 Some courts are
dismissive of the notion that a criminal prosecution could provide useful
rehabilitation, for example.296 Others point to the ways in which criminal
290. State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007).
291. Pa. State Police v. Fraternal Order of Police, 634 A.2d 789, 792 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993),
rev’d, 666 A.2d 641(Pa. 1995).
292. State v. Woll, 668 P.2d 610, 612 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
293. See Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice
Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 2 (2009).
294. For deterrence, see Commonwealth v. Matty, 619 A.2d 1383, 1389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(finding dismissal appropriate where “even before he was prosecuted, appellant was punished by forces
other than the criminal law [including losing his job] to the degree necessary to deter him from
repeating the minor transgression”).
295. See People v. Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d 936, 948 (Syracuse City Ct. 1980), rev’d, 459 N.Y.S.2d
344 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1981) (“[T]his criminal stigma can foreseeably be counter-reproductive to an ability
to meet future support obligations.”); Brown, supra note 111, at 345 (cost-benefit analysis “would help
examine the risk that incarceration may sometimes harm one of the primary goals it purports to serve”).
296. See People v. M.K.R., 632 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1995) (“[W]hile it may be true
that defendant may need some guidance in his life, probation for a sexual misconduct charge is not the
appropriate avenue for that help.”).
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prosecution can disrupt efforts at self-rehabilitation.297 Similarly, rather
than deter, some convictions may in fact impel more law-breaking.298
By relying on the notion that the criminal law should be a last rather
than first resort, these cases provide support for scholars who have urged
the concept of criminal law as the ultima ratio (last resort),299 but who have
not been able to point to much real-world implementation of this principle,
at least in this country.300 These cases show that at least some judges can be
persuaded to exercise their dismissal power on this basis.
In addition to showing that this principle has traction within our
criminal justice system, these cases are valuable because of the questions
that they pose by drawing on this concept. The first, of course, is the
question of when the criminal law is indeed a necessary response rather
than a harmful default.301 A second, and related, question is what should be
the scope of the principle that judges should bar the gate to the criminal law
when “something else is going on.” After all, many scholars assert that in
huge swaths of the criminal justice system as currently implemented302—
and perhaps throughout the entire system—“something else” is going on.303
Finally, even if one is drawn to the notion of alternative mechanisms to the
297. See People v. Mason, 411 N.Y.S.2d 970, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (dismissing where “there
has been overwhelming proof as to the extraordinary strides that defendant has taken toward total
rehabilitation of himself as a valuable and contributing citizen of the community. . . . This extraordinary
achievement, against what many would view as hopeless odds, would be utterly destroyed by the
imposition of a jail sentence at this time.”); In re Stephens, 413 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1979) (“To compel the Respondent to participate in suppression hearings and fact-finding hearings in
these matters, would not be productive and, in fact, would only delay the rehabilitation which the
Respondent is now undergoing.”); State v. Cantrell, 758 P.2d 1, 6 (Wash. 1988) (“[I]f the State’s delay
interferes with a particular juvenile’s rehabilitation, justice would be furthered by dismissal.”).
298. People v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342, 346 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979) (“If a prostitute is beholden
to a pimp, his supplying funds to pay this fine will further obligate her to him by the rules of the jungle
in which they function. If she works alone, the net effect of this punishment is to send her back to the
streets to earn these funds by again selling her body.”).
299. See, e.g., Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 521 (2005).
300. See supra note 9; Jareborg, supra note 299, at 524 (“Criminalization is regularly used as a
first resort (sola ratio).”); id. at 525 (stating that “[t]he most authoritative expression of an ultima ratio
principle is found in a decision by the German Constitutional Court”).
301. See GREEN, supra note 275, at 138 (“What conduct should be subject to criminal sanctions
is one of the most complex questions in all of criminal law theory.”).
302. See, e.g., Henry Ordower et al., Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax
Distribution and Constitutional Limitations 16, 23 (St. Louis Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 2016-14),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854372 (arguing that in the City of Ferguson and
other parts of St. Louis County, the “revenue function has supplanted the public safety function of the
municipal justice system,” and thus “state constitutional taxing limitations should apply”).
303. See, e.g., LOÏC WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY (2009) (suggesting that the growing use
of criminal enforcement dissolves the welfare state and keeps poor people under control); Sterling,
supra note 122, at 2251 (“A number of scholars have described the modern-day criminal justice system
as the latest recapitulation of a legally sanctioned racial caste system that dates back to United States
chattel slavery.”); Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain
Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 786–801 (2005) (discussing the criminal justice system’s
social control function).
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criminal law, the question remains of how to minimize the attendant risks
of bias and disparity. It may be that it is in particular those of relative
privilege—doctors, lawyers, and the insured, for example—who are able to
point to alternative mechanisms that can address alleged harm,304 and it
may be that those with resources are more able to engage in “selfrehabilitation.”305 If one is drawn to the ultima ratio principle, one must
consider ways in which its disparate impact can be minimized.
2. Clean Hands
Governmental wrongdoing does not generally provide a defense to a
criminal charge, unless one can show that the government has violated
certain constitutional rights or engaged in entrapment.306 In other words, to
the extent that the criminal law has something resembling the “clean
hands” doctrine, under which improper conduct can bar legal victory,307 it
is sharply limited,308 at least when defendants invoke it.309 Yet, in this
group of cases, judges frequently dismiss because they view the
government as lacking clean hands—notwithstanding the absence of
entrapment or a constitutional violation310—and sometimes read
“government” very broadly.
In some of the cases, the unclean hands are those of law enforcement
agents directly involved in the case, whether police or prosecutors.311
Police have unclean hands, for example, when they order a man out into the

304. See Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 981–84 (2007).
305. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41–42 (2007) (describing “selfrehabilitat[ion]” of University of Iowa student arrested on drugs charges).
306. For a discussion of entrapment and its rarity as a successful defense, see Jessica A. Roth,
The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2014).
307. See Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F. Supp. 470, 476 (D. Colo. 1996) (finding of unclean
hands requires “improper conduct”).
308. See United States v. Tanke, No. 209-CR-0293-WBS-KJN-P, 2016 WL 6248413 at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (“The doctrine of unclean hands is not available as a defense in criminal cases.”);
Tate v. State, 706 P.2d 169 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1985) (same). The most prominent reference to clean
hands in a criminal case came in Olmstead, in which Justice Brandeis asserted that on the basis of the
clean hands doctrine the courts should exclude evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of state
criminal law. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 574 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A] court will not redress a wrong when he who
invokes its aid has unclean hands.”).
309. Note that a perceived lack of clean hands, in the form of a prior conviction, or in the form of
having “contributed” to a wrongful conviction by taking a plea or “confessing,” can block wrongful
conviction compensation. See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). A
perceived lack of clean hands on the part of a defendant can also scupper such defenses as necessity and
self-defense.
310. See, e.g., People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1908).
311. For prosecutors, see, for example, People v. Mason, 411 N.Y.S.2d 970, 975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978).
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street to move his truck and then arrest him for drunk driving two houses
down the block.312 So too when they leave a bag spilling forth electronics
and cash onto a Brooklyn subway platform, and then arrest a man for
picking up the bag—even absent a showing of entrapment.313 So too when
they are “gratuitously foul” in the violence, intrusiveness, and, homophobia
that they display in arresting men on charges of public sex,314 even where
the court finds no due process violation.315
Case law has expanded this notion a little further to encompass
probation officers. In one case alleging that the defendant had violated a
probation condition by drinking a malt beverage, the prosecution was
dismissed where the drink had been imbibed at the probation officer’s
house, with his “knowledge and consent.”316 The court remarked that
“[g]iven his authority and position as an officer of the Department of
Corrections and, effectively, as an agent of the court, Ball’s misconduct
must be counted heavily in mitigation of the offense.”317 The court asked,
“Would not the public see [further prosecution] as the system punishing a
young defendant when he did not even get the services he had a right to
expect from the sentence the court imposed on him?”318 As the defense
brief argued, it was the probation officer’s “grossly inadequate supervision
of [the defendant] that created the environment and opportunity for [the
defendant] to consume alcohol.”319
Some of the cases go still further, hinting at the notion that if the
prosecution is to claim the label of “the State,” it may need to suffer for
failings of the state that go beyond those of police, prosecutors, and
probation officers, including failures to provide needed services. Thus, in
one case, a motivation for the dismissal of the prosecution of a Vietnam

312. People v. Asche, 669 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1998).
313. See People v. Arroyo, 815 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923–24 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2006) (“‘Operation
Lucky Bag’ can be viewed as an unfair enticement to commit crime. In order to further fairness and
justice, the circumstances at hand compel the court to dismiss all charges against the defendant.”).
314. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d at 338–39 (“Joseph P. stated that he was forcibly seized and
handcuffed with his hands behind his back. His foot was kicked to the side when he was told to spread
his legs. During the checking of his car, he stated that a police officer ripped up the rug and this
allegation is not denied. He was stripped and searched by one trooper in a large open room in the State
Police Barracks and held naked in that room for some period of time. Another trooper walked in stating
‘Too bad an Italian had to be a faggot.’”).
315. See id. at 339.
316. State v. Keneally, No. 2002-199, 2002 WL 34422304, at *1 (Vt. Dec. 1, 2002).
317. Id. at *3.
318. Id.
319. Brief of Appellant at *4, Keneally, No. 2002-199, 2002 WL 32813901 [hereinafter Keneally
Brief]. For Supreme Court support for a broad reading of “government” failings that can be held against
the prosecution, see speedy trial case Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (“A more neutral
reason [for delay] such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest
with the government rather than with the defendant.”).
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veteran was the extent of governmental failures to protect those returning
from Vietnam.320 This dismissal was reversed,321 but this case law forces us
to confront the question of where—if one admits that governmental failings
are sometimes relevant to a calculation of the defendant’s punishable
harms—the line should be drawn between relevant and irrelevant failures,
or relevant and irrelevant involvement in the creation of an “environment
and opportunity” for law breaking.322 Within at least some of these cases
one can detect an expansive vision, which rejects the notion that justice can
be achieved by judging an alleged act in isolation from the context—
including the context of social deprivation—that may surround it.323
3. Holistic Calculation of Costs
An additional component of the vision of the criminal law laid out in
these cases is an attempt to conduct an assessment of the costs imposed by
criminal prosecution that is as holistic as possible, in terms of the variety of
interests and individuals harmed and the temporal scope of the harms
considered.
As regards broad consideration of the interests and individuals harmed,
we see dismissals based on harm to the complainant,324 to the defendant
and his family,325 to other third parties,326 to the purposes commonly

320. State v. Stough, 939 P.2d 652, 654 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (“I think the government put these
people in the field, screwed them up. They come back, they self-medicate with alcohol and drugs. Many
of them committed suicide. Interesting statistic is that 50,000 were killed over there, but more than
50,000 committed suicide when they came back because of the treatment that they received. And I just
want to say that over 0.03 grams of cocaine, or whatever it was, I’m not willing to put him through
another minute.” (quoting the trial court)).
321. Id. (finding that “[t]he reasons for which the trial court dismissed the charge are not
attributable to the prosecution”).
322. Keneally Brief, supra note 320, at *4.
323. See Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 L. & INEQ. 9 (1985); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of
Criminal Law: Why Courts and Legislatures Ignore Richard Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 79, 80 (2011) (saying that Professor Delgado’s article “has played an
important role in the evolution of scholarship on criminal responsibility but no role whatsoever in the
evolution of case and statutory law on the same subject”); id. at 82 (arguing that because the rotten
social background doctrine asserts that “part of the blame for a crime rests on society,” it “violates
every major assumption of the modern American rule of criminal law”).
324. See State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1165 (Vt. 1995) (dismissing prosecution for sexual
abuse of a minor where “[t]he court [was] concerned about the effect on [complainant], a very troubled
young lady, about participating in such a trial for a second time”).
325. People v. Shanis, 374 N.Y.S.2d 912, 920 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (“[M]ore than 50
appearances in many courtrooms have resulted in a crushing financial burden as a result of which the
defendant was forced to file a petition in bankruptcy.”); State v. Keneally, No. 2002-199, 2002 WL
34422304, at *2 (Vt. Dec. 1, 2002) (overturning denial of motion to dismiss a case charging possession
of alcohol in violation of probation, where the harm “was more to defendant and his family than to the
public”).
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thought to motivate the criminal law,327 and to other potential beneficiaries
of the state money that is being devoted to prosecution.328
As regards broad consideration of the temporal sweep of these harms,
we see dismissals based on both pre-adjudication and post-conviction
harms. An important component of the case law addressing preadjudication harm is the original set of New York factors, laid out in the
landmark case of People v. Clayton,329 which included consideration of the
“punishment already suffered by [the] defendant.”330 While this factor is
not included in the current statutory language,331 it maintains relevance in
the case law of that state and others,332 with courts freely using the term
“punishment” to refer to pre-adjudication harms.333
These cases thus provide useful support for those pushing to increase
the extent to which harms inflicted by prosecution are calculated within,
and factored into, the criminal process. First, they offer support to those
who assert that there needs to be a bigger role for cost-benefit analysis
within the criminal law.334 We see judges looking at the broad swath of
326. See People v. Eubanks, 436 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1981), rev’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d
768 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (dismissing charge of unlawfully obtaining unemployment benefits
where “defendant has been employed for more than one year as a live-in house parent for mentally
retarded adults. As such, she is responsible for the welfare of these individuals.”); Howell, supra note
92, at 329 (listing harms inflicted on individuals and communities by the prosecution of minor alleged
offenses).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 284–88.
328. See Howell, supra note 92, at 321; supra text accompanying notes 80–84.
329. 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
330. See People v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342, 346 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979) (“Each of these
defendants has been arrested and spent at least some time incarcerated awaiting arraignment. The Court
considers this enough punishment to satisfy this element of Clayton.”).
331. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.40, 210.40 (McKinney 2007).
332. See, e.g., People v. Gragert, 765 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003) (“[D]ue to the
erroneous warrant, the defendant has already suffered a ‘punishment’ far greater than what would have
resulted from her conviction in this case. Finally, the defendant’s loss of liberty is a ‘relevant fact’
under subsection (j), the ‘catchall’ factor, that further tips the balance of the equities in favor of a
dismissal in the interest of justice.”).
333. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (dismissing
case alleging bubble gum theft where “[t]he consequences which have already attended the arrest of this
defendant are more punitive than those which would follow conviction. . . . The conviction if imposed
would be anticlimactic, and the minor penalty which might be imposed would pale in significance to
that already endured.”); People v. Doe, N.Y. L.J., April 6, 1979, at 12 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) (“The
defendant has been subjected to punishment by virtue of his incarveration [sic] from the time of his
arrest at approximately 5:40 A.M. on Sept. 22, 1978, until his release from custody upon parole at
approximately 8:30 P.M. later that day, a period of about 14 hours.”); id. (stating that post-arrest life
“effectively amounted to . . . emotional and psychological incarceration”).
334. See Brown, supra note 111, at 328 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis “can be and should be
applied to criminal law much as it has been applied to other executive regulation”); id. at 345 (costbenefit analysis “would help examine the risk that incarceration may sometimes harm one of the
primary goals it purports to serve”); Mark A. Cohen, The ‘Cost of Crime’ and Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Criminal
Justice
Policy
(working
paper
2016)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2832944 (calling cost-benefit analysis of criminal
justice policies an “important tool,” but one that is “still in its infancy”).
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harms from even a relatively minor prosecution or conviction,335 and
finding that there is no, or no comparable, benefit to justify it.336 We even
see one judge attempting financial calculations on this issue, adding up
what it cost to conduct a prostitution prosecution, and conjuring up a vision
of what else that money might have achieved.337
These cases also provide fodder for those who urge that it is
nonsensical to attempt to conceive of an appropriate punishment without
factoring in components beyond the mandated sentence,338 and thus that the
conventional view of “punishment” must be expanded.339 This push has
been particularly evident in the context of collateral consequences,340 and in
this case law we find support for these efforts in the willingness of judges
to factor in at least some of these consequences when determining whether
conviction is appropriate.
By suggesting a need for a fuller calculation of harms imposed by
criminal prosecution, and for inclusion of at least some of those harms in
the calculation of “punishment,”341 these cases provoke a series of related
questions. First, what is to be done to address the various impacts of

335. See Howell, supra note 92, at 329.
336. See People v. Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d 936, 948 (Syracuse City Ct. 1980), rev’d, 459 N.Y.S.2d
344 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1981) (“A criminal conviction on a previously unblemished record can accomplish
little more than impede any potential increases in earning capacity.”); People v. Shanis, 374 N.Y.S.2d
912, 922 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (dismissing manslaughter indictment where “[h]aving reviewed all of the
facts and circumstances available, this court is unable to visualize any purpose to be served by further
punishment although it is far easier to imagine its effect”).
337. See State v. Thoreson, No. A06–454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10,
2007) (guesstimating that at the trial level the case “cost the taxpayers several hundred to a few
thousand dollars,” and at the appellate level “another several hundred to a few thousand dollars,” and
pointing out that nothing was gained—“If appellant is a prostitute, after her $50 fine, she is back on the
streets telling her friends to be careful of Minneapolis Vice, ‘they have a new “trick” up their sleeve.’”).
338. See Brown, supra note 111, at 364 (“[C]onsider what [cost-benefit analysis] could show a
retributivist about the full range of unintended consequences caused by criminal punishment. If
punishment policy imposes indirect harms on innocents, retributivism presumably would recognize a
duty to refrain from [c]reating such harms—and injustice—if they exceed the harms of unpunished
criminal conduct.”); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 301, 303 (2015) (“Courts have consistently found that [collateral consequences] do not
constitute punishment.”).
339. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1830 (2012) (“Sentencing is designed to impose punishment that
is proportionate to the offense and consistent with that imposed on similar offenders. These goals
cannot be achieved without evaluating the total package of sentencing facing an individual.”).
340. See, e.g., id. at 1830–31 (describing scholarship urging courts to classify collateral
consequences as punishment); Project Description, NATIONAL INVENTORY ON THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
OF
CONVICTION
(2012),
https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Resources/Ref/
CollConsequenceProjDescrip-2012.pdf (“When particular restrictions have no apparent regulatory
rationale, and cannot be avoided or mitigated, they function as additional punishment, though without
due process protections.”).
341. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 19-2.4 (2004) (providing that sentencing
courts “should consider[] applicable collateral sanctions in determining an offender’s overall
sentence”).
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implicit (and explicit) bias on calculations of harm and loss suffered,342 and
the fact that items assessed as “losses”—home, job, and education, for
example—may have been accrued as a result of racial and other
privilege?343 Next, if costs are to be more fully calculated, the question
arises of how this can be done in a more systematic fashion than the backof-the-envelope calculations of individual judges. For example, the
question arises of how and by whom collateral consequences should be
calculated, if they are to be factored into the desirability of either continued
prosecution or particular sentences.344 The burden of discovering these
collateral consequences currently falls on the already-exhausted shoulders
of defense counsel,345 or non-profit initiatives,346 or defendants.347 If judges
are suggesting, however, that an assessment of what is “just” in a case
includes an assessment of likely collateral consequences, then one might
conclude that it is imperative for prosecutors wanting to honor their “do
justice” mandate to assess the potential consequences as fully as they
can.348 After all, prominent prosecutors have declared that collateral
consequences can impede just outcomes,349 and individual prosecutors have

342. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIMINALS 144–51 (1988) (revealing judicial perceptions that white-collar defendants
experience prison differently than others); I. Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1277, 1294 (2016) (noting that the “perceived softness of the defendant” may be “racially
coded”).
343. See People v. Davis, 286 N.Y.S.2d 396, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (“This court believes that
the instant case involving as it does a defendant of exceptional background and promising future and
charged with a crime, conviction of which would sully the one and stifle the other, is a case crying out
for the application of this most humane statutory provision.”); Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race
Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 982–92 (2010) (reviewing data showing racial disparities in
income, wealth, education, housing, employment, and criminal justice).
344. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 19-2.1 (2004) (“The legislature should
collect, set out or reference all collateral sanctions in a single chapter or section of the jurisdiction’s
criminal code.”).
345. See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1395
(2011) (arguing that Padilla v. Kentucky, which declared that failure to advise a client of the nearly
certain deportation consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, see 559
U.S. 356 (2010), will have limited impact because it requires defense attorneys to stay apprised of a
broad array of collateral consequences).
346. In compiling the NICCC, the ABA exhausted one federal grant and was able to continue
only as a result of a second federal grant being awarded. See email from Madeline Neighly (Jan. 17,
2017) (on file with author).
347. See People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400–01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (describing efforts of
defendant—”an admitted neophyte in immigration matters” with “limited financial resources”—to
overcome his attorney’s admitted ignorance about the immigration consequences of the proffered plea
deal, by paying an immigration paralegal to assess his situation (inaccurately, as it turned out)).
348. For this mandate, see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
349. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 41 (2007) (“At times, the collateral consequences of a conviction are so severe that we
are unable to deliver a proportionate penalty in the criminal justice system without disproportionate
collateral consequences.” (quoting Robert M.A. Johnson, President of the National Defense Attorneys
Association)).
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shown themselves willing and able to collate these consequences in cases
in which they urge that because of the attendant collateral consequences
conviction should be permitted.350
Assuming that “punishment” continues to be interpreted to cover less
than the full range of harms imposed through prosecution, these cases also
raise the question of whether the “theories of punishment” commonly used
to justify sentences need to be supplemented by “theories of prosecution”
that would be required to justify other harms, and that would support
dismissal when such justification is lacking.351 In a world where the
conviction or formal punishment can be “anticlimactic” in light of all that
has gone before,352 the end cannot be assumed to justify the means.353
4. Noble Human Motives
The traditional view within criminal law is that defendants’ alleged
motives are irrelevant to the question of liability.354 This body of case law
challenges that view. Again and again, one finds judges moved to dismiss
in light of their assessment of defendants’ motives.355 When those motives
350. See State v. Corchado, 512 A.2d 183, 185 (Conn. 1986) (“[T]he state claims that significant
governmental and societal interests favor ‘identifying those guilty of criminal activity and having valid
convictions entered against them.’ It postulates that the strength of such interests is ‘fortified by the
substantial collateral consequences attending conviction for a serious crime.’” (quoting Fitzgerald v.
U.S., 472 A.2d 52, 54 (D.C. App. 1984))); Commonwealth v. Grinnan, No. 2126-EDA-2013, 2014 WL
10920262, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 8, 2014) (mentioning “the Commonwealth’s desire to prosecute to
preserve Appellant’s criminal record and for potential license suspension consequences”).
351. For the “gap in the socio-legal literature” relating to theories of prosecution, see Ronald F.
Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 28
(2007). For case law reaching toward this idea, see, for example, Watson v. United States, 979 A.2d
1254, 1263 (D.C. 2009) (noting circumstances suggesting that an alleged offense was “not a crime
meriting prosecution or conviction”).
352. See People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1980) (“Political scientist
Malcom Feeley has suggested that lawyers may be inappropriate for misdemeanors where prison is not
a realistic possibility. In these cases, the process itself is the punishment. The defendant wants to get in
and out of court as soon as possible. But he must suffer bail, attorneys’ fees, adjournments to get an
attorney, time for an attorney to make motions, and so forth. After all that, paying a fifty dollar fine is
certainly anticlimactic.” (quoting Paul Nejelski, Do Minor Disputes Deserve Second-Class Justice?, 61
JUDICATURE 102 (1977))).
353. See State v. Martinez, 86 P.3d. 1210, 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
354. See Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
653, 656 (2005) (“Generations of scholars of the criminal law have learned that motive is irrelevant in
the criminal law. It is especially irrelevant with respect to liability for a crime.” (footnote omitted));
Douglas Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3 (1989) (“This thesis is
endorsed, sometimes with minor qualifications, by almost all leading criminal theorists.”); Margulies,
supra note 2 (“Because motive has no place in a criminal trial, the prosecutor does not need to
understand why events happened, or why they might have been endorsed by the community. She does
not need to understand the complex social, racial, and political dynamics at work.”).
355. See Pomorski, supra note 9, at 97–98 (“[I]n [Hawaii case] Ornellas, the court pointed out
that the assault was committed ‘without any apparent provocation,’ a clear suggestion that not only the
actor’s intent, but also his or her motivation should have a bearing on the triviality issue.” (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted)).
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are ones esteemed as noble—when, for example, they are focused on the
welfare of children356—courts show no hesitation in deeming motive a
ground for dismissal.
Thus, the top three counts were chopped off a robbery indictment in a
case alleging armed robbery of an office building so that the defendant
could obtain a sentence of probation.357 While the court found the offense
“serious” and the prosecution’s case “a strong one,” it was moved by the
desperate financial situation that the defendant faced after losing his job,
and his inability to “thread his way through the labyrinth of city agencies”
for financial assistance for himself, his paraplegic wife, and his two-yearold daughter.358 Where a defendant was charged with custodial interference
in relation to his three-day effort to get legal custody of his son, who had
shown up at his house saying that he was scared of his mother’s new
husband, the court dismissed, finding it “obvious” that the defendant
“would be prejudiced if he is convicted of the crime by his ‘so called
criminal activities’ when in fact he was using a legal remedy with his son’s
best interest at heart.”359 And turning back to the pink spray-painted fairy,
the judge seemed moved by the notion that her creator was merely trying
“to provide fleeting joy to school children.”360
Thus, again, this case law offers support for those commentators who
have suggested that there is indeed a place within the criminal law for
considerations of motive, even on the question of liability.361 As with the
other principles, however, it forces us to consider difficult line-drawing
questions: which motives, for example, should be relevant?362
B. Expanding the Applicability of These Principles
Part IV.A laid out four principles that emerge from these
geographically disparate cases and that create a vision of a criminal law
system in which a holistic accounting of factors is attempted in lieu of a
356. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89,
107–08 (2006) (identifying motive of helping one’s family as a mitigating factor at sentencing).
357. People v. Perez, 553 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661–62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
358. Id.
359. People v. Tegins, 395 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1977).
360. People v. Thomas, 998 N.Y.S.2d 612, 616 (Ithaca City Ct. 2014) (“Here, all of the
circumstances evince not evil intent, but rather enthusiasm and exuberance. This Court finds that
Defendant Thomas’ intent was to provide fleeting joy to school children, not to damage or deface public
property.”).
361. See Chiu, supra note 354, at 656 (“Recently . . . several criminal law scholars and legal
philosophers have begun to debate the role of motive in the criminal law.”); Hessick, supra note 356, at
97–98 (mentioning the relevance of motive to justification defenses).
362. See, for example, judicial reluctance to dismiss prosecutions against those charged with
organizing needle exchange programs designed to protect drug users. E.g., State v. Sorge, 591 A.2d
1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
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decontextualized consideration of alleged law breaking. These principles
are not mainstream components of our criminal justice system,363 and this
judicial reliance on them offers support to those scholars who have urged
them. This is a confined area of procedure, however, and this Part will
begin to explore the possibility of the broader application of these factors
beyond this procedural context.
It is first worth noting that it may be that some of the constraints
discussed in Part III have helped to free up judges to invoke the broad
principles upon which the dismissals rest. It may be, for example, that the
judicial narrowing of this remedy—including the carving out of certain
crimes and defendants, the availability of (sometimes intrusive) appellate
review, the ability of prosecutors to refile after a case is dismissed, and the
limiting of dismissals to cases that courts find exceptional—reassures
judges that they can declare or rely on broad principles within this discrete
procedural context and not create too many ripples. Similarly, it may be
that the human connectivity whose workings are so vulnerable to bias helps
inspire judges to enunciate broad principles. We see traces of this
inspiration in some of these opinions: judges call upon poetry,364 novels,365
operetta,366 philosophy,367 and declarations of our Founding Fathers.368
They are delving deep into the sources and expressions of human
inspiration—they are the very opposite of mechanical case-processors.
This Article proposes that these principles deserve consideration not
only in this context, but also in other, less constrained contexts. They
deserve consideration in connection with defendants whose circumstances

363. See, e.g., Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 112, at 340 (“[C]riminal law
traditionally focuses only on the benefits of punishment (deterrence, retribution) regardless of the costs
on others—employees, clients or creditors of firms, offenders’ families, and communities—of
punishing individual or corporate offenders.”); id. at 326–27 (“[T]here is an emerging literature
comparing the range of costs imposed by criminal law to its benefits, but it so far has had little effect on
the practice or administrative structure of criminal justice. Indeed, current practice even makes it hard to
imagine how it could.”); Jennifer M. Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327,
1333 n.12 (2008) (recognizing that an ultima ratio approach “stands at odds with current constitutional
doctrine that permits promiscuous use of severe criminal sanctions”).
364. See State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10,
2007) (“Drunkards and whores are doomed to hell, so men declare, Believe it not, ‘tis but a foolish care;
If drunkards and lovers are for hell, Anon, heaven will be empty.” (quoting Omar Khayyam’s
Rubaiyat)).
365. See, e.g., Thomas, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (quoting J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan).
366. See Watson v. United States, 979 A.2d. 1254, 1263 n.9 (D.C. 2009) (quoting W.S. Gilbert’s
The Mikado).
367. See People v. Shanis, 374 N.Y.S.2d 912, 923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (quoting Aristotle).
368. See Commonwealth v. Moll, 543 A.2d 1221, 1226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (dismissing
prosecution based on alleged cutting of a hole in a county-installed drain pipe to avoid flood damage to
the defendant’s property and quoting Thomas Jefferson letter to James Madison, which asserted that “a
little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the
physical”).
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may resonate less with judges,369 and deserve consideration by decision
makers other than judges.370 For, even while these principles may lead to
dismissal only in certain cases, there is no logical reason why, if they are
relevant and persuasive in these cases, they should not be considered in all
cases: nothing in them declares or suggests their limited applicability.
In urging the opportunity to take the principles that moved the judges
in these cases and explore their broader applicability, this Article joins
recent articles that have suggested that when one finds an area of the
criminal law that appears to embody disparity—greater protection of
suspects when they are police officers, for example,371 or lighter sentences
for those convicted of sexual assault when they are white372—one should
resist the general trend toward ratcheting down to a vision of equality that
restricts freedom for all (Stop coddling the cops! Stop coddling the White
rapists!373) and instead explore visions of equality that ratchet up in the
direction of extending freedom for all.374
While a full exploration of the extent to which these kinds of principles
are, or might be, applied in a context beyond this procedural one is beyond
the scope of this Article, some hopeful signs are worth flagging. Recent
editions of model prosecutorial guidelines urge these kinds of criteria as
potentially relevant in cases of all kinds,375 and potentially relevant even
before charges have been filed.376 The federal prosecutorial guidelines
369. See Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model
Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 250 (1995) (“States which have adopted [MPC 2.12] have not
been able to reach uniform results within their own jurisdictions, much less between them.”).
370. See State v. McDonald, 137 P. 362, 363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914) (“It must never be
forgotten that the enforcement of justice is the sole object of the law.”), overruled by State v. Shi, 566
P.2d 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
371. See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1202 (2016) (“upend[ing] the
dominant response from scholars and politicians” to enhanced protections for law enforcement suspects
by arguing that we should extend some of these protections “to all suspects rather than strip them from
the police”).
372. See Gabby Bess, How Racial Bias Influenced Stanford Swimmer’s Rape Case, VICE (June
7, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/brock-turner-rape-case-sentencing-racial-bias.
373. See Tara Culp-Ressler, Mandatory Minimums Aren’t the Right Way to Fix Rape Culture,
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/mandatory-minimums-arent-theright-way-to-fix-rape-culture-3d217f28b911#.e3i5u2qsb (saying with respect to California’s post-Brock
Turner mandatory minimum sentencing provision enactment, “We have falsely equated punishment and
protection in the United States.”).
374. See Brown, supra note 111, at 328 (“For a quarter century, the United States has addressed
crime through drastically increased use of incarceration.”).
375. Cf. Leipold, supra note 99, at 316 (recommending a nullification defense “available to all
similarly-situated defendants, not just to those who happen upon a jury that knows of [its] nullification
power”).
376. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-4.4 (2015) (among “the factors which
the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal
charge” are any “voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation; . . . whether the authorized or likely
punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or the
offender; . . . any improper conduct by law enforcement; . . . potential collateral impact on third parties,
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contain some of the same components.377 The problem remains, however,
that these guidelines have not been adopted as actual prosecutorial policies
at the state level, much less the kinds of prosecutorial rules that some
demand:
“rigorous,
publicly-vetted,
legislatively-implemented
378
guidelines.” One can at least hope that the fact that judges in so many
states in interpreting so many bits of statutory language have converged on
these principles, and found them to be important enough components of
justice that they were persuaded to dismiss,379 will assist the project of
persuading prosecutors to do the same.380
CONCLUSION
These statutes and the cases interpreting them rebut the notion that it is
necessary to choose between an approach that chips away at some of the
worst aspects of our criminal justice system and one that pushes toward a
vision of a very different system. In these dismissals discrete acts of
rebellion are occurring: both against facets of the criminal justice system
and against the notion that state court judges are powerless to address them.
At the same time, the threads of justice that appear in these individual cases
can be woven together into a patchwork vision of a very different system.
including witnesses or victims; . . . the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial
resources; . . . [and] whether the public’s interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated by
available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies”); NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N,
PROSECUTION STANDARDS (2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20
Revised%20Commentary.pdf (“Prosecutors should screen potential charges to eliminate from the
criminal justice system those cases where prosecution is not justified or not in the public interest,” and
factors that they may consider include “[t]he availability of adequate civil remedies; . . . [w]hether nonprosecution would assist in achieving . . . legitimate goals; . . . [t]he attitude and mental state of the
accused; . . . [u]ndue hardship that would be caused to the accused by the prosecution; . . . [f]ailure of
law enforcement to perform necessary duties; . . . [and w]hether the accused has already suffered
substantial loss in connection with the alleged crime.”).
377. Under the DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution, one “situation in which the prosecutor
may properly decline to take action” is where “[t]here exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION § 9-27.220(A)(2) (2017).
One consideration relevant to whether there is a substantial federal interest to justify prosecution is
“Federal law enforcement priorities,” since “Federal law enforcement resources [and Federal judicial
resources] are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every alleged offense over which federal
jurisdiction exists.” Id. at § 9-27.230(B)(1). Another is “[t]he probable sentence or other consequences
if the person is convicted.” Id. at § 9-27.230(A)(8).
(Aug.
30,
2016,
5:45
378.
John
Pfaff
(@JohnFPfaff),
TWITTER
PM), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/770784656799268864 (“What we need are rigorous,
publicly-vetted, legislatively-implemented guidelines that cover every stage of the prosecution
process.”); see also Barry Friedman (@barryfriedman1), TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:52
PM), https://twitter.com/barryfriedman1/status/770786270687657984 (retweeting Professor Pfaff’s
message and expressing apparent endorsement with the hashtag #DemocraticProsecution).
379. See People v. Winters, 342 P.2d 538, 541–42 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1959) (referring
to the “great power” of dismissal).
380. For the idea that in exercising these dismissals judges are sending messages to law
enforcement, see, for example, State v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 977 P.2d 400, 407 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
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In those cases that resonate with them—where, for example, a judge can
see a defendant as his child—judges are moved to lay out broad principles
of justice. We should consider the possibility of applying these principles
more broadly, in contexts that are less constrained, and in ways that are
more systematic. For each of us is someone’s child.

